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Evgeniya Victorova: Essays on Vertically Contracted Industries - Empirical Analyses of 
the U.S. Cable Industry 
(Under the direction of Sriram Venkataraman) 
 
Industries in which firms deal with intermediaries to supply their products or services to final 
consumers are ubiquitous. One particular feature of these vertically integrated industries is that 
they are often characterized by a bilateral oligopolistic structure wherein the terms of trade 
between the upstream and the downstream firms are often determined through negotiations. 
Despite the vast theoretical literature in economics and marketing on negotiations in 
vertically related industries, empirical research investigating bargaining outcomes in such 
settings is somewhat scant. My dissertation attempts to address this research gap in the empirical 
context of the U.S. cable industry. 
In Chapter 1 of my dissertation I investigate the impact of horizontal mergers in vertically 
related industries. Specifically, I study how horizontal mergers impact the vertical contracting 
outcomes and consequently the prices and composition of bundles that cable providers offer to 
end consumers. The central innovation of this essay is a structural bilateral bargaining model 
between content distributors and content creators. 
However, in practice, bargaining between content creators and distributors may fail. When 
such negotiations fail, the distributor is not legally permitted to distribute that content creator’s 
programs to its cable subscribers. Consequently, the associated channel is “blacked out” 





Chapter 2 investigates how disruptions to TV programming caused by unsuccessful vertical 
bargaining can have the effect on (i) costs of advertising on the disrupted and non-disrupted TV 
channels, (ii) advertising eyeballs (gross rating points) for the disrupted and non-disrupted TV 
channels, and (iii) market shares of disrupted and non-disrupted distributors. I causally estimate 
these effects using three distinct comparative case-study approaches to treatment effects 
estimation, namely: (a) difference-in-difference, (b) synthetic control, and (c) synthetic 
difference-in-difference. 
The econometric models advanced in this thesis yield valuable managerial insights on how 
vertical bargaining outcomes are impacted by horizontal mergers and how failed vertical 
bargaining outcomes impact consumer demand and advertising revenues in the U.S. television 
industry. I hope this dissertation spawns new ideas for future empirical research on managerially 
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CHAPTER 1: HORIZONTAL MERGERS – IMPACT ON COMPETITVE PRICING 
AND PRODUCT PROVISIONING 
 
1.1 Overview 
Vertically integrated industries are omnipresent. These include grocery, medical devices, 
pharmaceutical, automobile, and the cable television industries, to name a few. One par ticular 
feature of these vertically integrated industries is that they are often characterized by a bilateral 
oligopolistic structure wherein the terms of trade between the upstream and downstream firms 
are often determined through bargaining. Heterogeneous bargaining  power between the 
negotiating entities significantly affects the size of total channel profits and consumer welfare. 
Despite the vast theoretical literature in economics and marketing on bargaining in  
vertically related industries, empirical research investigating bargaining outcomes in such 
settings is somewhat scant. This chapter of my dissertation attempts to address this research 
gap in the empirical context of the U.S. cable industry. Specifically, I study how 
horizontal mergers between cable providers impact the vertical contracting outcomes (per-
subscriber fees that TV cable providers pay the upstream content creator) and consequently 
the prices and composition of bundles that cable providers offer to end consumers. The 
central innovation of this essay is a structural bilateral bargaining  model between content 
providers and content creators. My model framework allows me  to conduct counterfactual 
analysis to assess the equilibrium impact of horizontal mergers  between cable providers on 
renegotiated vertical contracts between the merging entities  and content creators, as well as 




providers and their upstream content creators. The  new bilateral bargaining outcomes 
correspondingly impact the prices and cable bundle  compositions these cable providers offer 
to their end consumers in a given media market. 
So as to showcase the relevance of my research to policy makers, I use the modeling 
framework to evaluate the equilibrium implications of the attempted purchase of Time 
Warner Cable by Comcast in 2014. My results suggest that the proposed merger would  have 
resulted in lowering end-consumer prices (which increases consumer welfare) but at the same 
time would have also lowered quality provisioning by cable providers (which  decreases 
consumer welfare). In my empirical context, households are more sensitive to changes in 
prices than changes in quality. Thus, the decrease in prices offsets the  degradation in 
quality provisioning, leading to a net increase in consumer welfare. Lastly, I find that 
overlooking quality provisioning while evaluating merger application can  potentially lead 
to an erroneous understanding of changes to consumer welfare. 
1.2 Introduction 
 The companies’ decision to abandon this deal [Comcast’s acquisition of Time Warner Cable] 
is the best outcome for American consumers. 
 Eric Holder, Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice 
 
The pace of mergers and acquisitions has not abated over the past couple of decades 
and has led to a drastic consolidation across various industries, including the U.S. cable TV 
industry, which serves as the institutional setting of this dissertation. Some recent noteworthy 
deals include the vertical merger between Comcast and NBC Universal in 2013, the horizontal 
merger between AT&T and DirecTV in 2015, Charter’s acquisition of Time Warner Cable 





The strategic effects of mergers and their impact on consumer welfare have long been a 
source of debate in economics, marketing and antitrust circles.  In the United States, merger 
applications are reviewed and approved by the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal 
Trade Commission. The DOJ’s Horizontal Merger Guidelines acknowledges that proposed 
mergers need to be evaluated in terms of their price and non-price effects. See below: 
Enhancement of market power by sellers often elevates the prices charged to customers. For 
simplicity of exposition, these Guidelines generally discuss the analysis in terms of such 
price effects. ... Enhanced market power can also be manifested in non-price terms and 
conditions that adversely affect customers, including reduced product quality, reduced 
product variety, reduced service, or diminished innovation. 
Horizontal Merger Guidelines (2010), U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade 
Commission 
 
Nevertheless, the non-price effects of mergers have received far less attention than price 
effects in both academic research and in policy circles. That is, market power over price has 
been the primary focus of antitrust legislation (Kovacic and Shapiro 2000). Influential 
studies investigating the price effects of mergers include Baker and Bresnahan (1985), 
Hausman, Leonard, and Zona (1994) and Nevo (2000). By endogenizing price in their empirical 
framework, these studies are able to predict the price adjustments and changes in consumer 
welfare (either ex-ante or ex-post) resulting from a merger. The studies that followed recognized 
that the merging firms and their competitors may also choose to adjust their product offerings 
(eliminate or expand their product portfolio) or even change characteristics of their existing 
product portfolio. These studies, which span various industries, acknowledge the importance of 
endogenizing product characteristics when conducting merger analyses (see Draganska, Mazzeo, 
and Seim 2009; Fan 2013). 
Despite the rich set of new insights that these studies have afforded marketing managers 




substantively important questions. Take, for example, horizontal mergers in vertically 
contracted industries with differentiated products. In such environments, in the absence of 
cost efficiencies, theory predicts that greater retail concentration will result in greater market 
power which in turn will result in higher retail prices. However, in industries where markets 
are vertically related, variations in market concentration can  potentially also alter the 
equilibrium of the supply chain. This is because most vertically integrated industries are 
characterized by a bilateral oligopolistic structure wherein the terms of trade between the 
upstream and downstream firms are determined through bargaining. Hence, greater retail 
concentration can increase retailers’ bargaining power with upstream suppliers, thus inducing 
the price of its input to fall. If the decrease in the input price is passed through to the end 
consumer, it may compensate for the price hike due to heightened market power at the retail 
level. Hence, heterogeneous bargaining power between the negotiating entities can 
significantly affect the size of the total channel profits and consumer welfare via price effects 
alone. Therefore, from a price effect perspective alone, theory suggests that while evaluating
proposed merger applications in vertically integrated industries, competition and antitrust 
authorities should not only evaluate its impact on competitors and final consumers, but also 
for the merging firms’ trading partners (Gaudin 2017). Yet the extant academic literature on 
merger analysis has thus far overlooked the impact of downstream mergers on the vertical 
contracting outcomes of the merging entity and their horizontal peers/competitors with their 
respective upstream suppliers. 
Furthermore, if greater bargaining power for the merging entity lowers its input prices from 
upstream suppliers, then reduced input prices may increase the incentive for the merging entity 




to the end consumer at pre-merger prices. But, higher bargaining power with upstream 
suppliers coupled with higher retail consolidation as a result of the merger can also reduce 
the economic incentive for the merged entity to pass through these cost savings to the end 
consumer and/or provision higher product quality. Surprisingly, understanding the impact of 
downstream horizontal mergers on bargaining outcomes, and correspondingly on end-
consumer prices and quality provisioning remains unexplored in the current literature in 
marketing and economics. The current dissertation chapter addresses this research gap. 
Specifically, this chapter focuses on an important shortcoming inherent to existing merger 
analysis by studying the relationship between merger-induced changes in vertical contracts and 
downstream firms’ decisions on pricing and product quality. This paper contributes to the 
existing line of research by accounting for the change in distributors’ input costs that results 
from bargaining between upstream and downstream firms. 
The empirical framework I propose is grounded in the pioneering Berry (1994) and 
Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995) studies. In this paper, I estimate an equilibrium demand 
and supply model of consumers’ choices across  television bundles offered by major cable 
and satellite TV providers as well as a bargaining model between TV providers and 
channels. On the demand side, I specify a discrete-choice model with random coefficients 
on price and  quality. On the supply side, I allow firms to maximize their per-period profits  
by choosing the prices and quality of their product offerings (cable bundles in  my setting). I 
use my calibrated demand and supply-side models to conduct counterfactual analyses. 
Specifically, I simulate a merger between Comcast and Time Warner Cable, which was 
proposed in 2014 but called off in 2015. 




do not permit downstream cable providers to adjust their product quality or renegotiate their 
input costs following this counterfactual approved merger. My counterfactual analysis reveals 
that in such a scenario, consumers will face higher prices ($2.68 and $0.82 per month more for 
Comcast/TWC bundles and cable bundles from other competing cable providers 
respectively). Higher end-consumer prices at a status-quo quality level result  in eroding 
consumer welfare. At the same time, the merging cable providers and their competitors realize 
higher profits, albeit accompanied by a reduction in their market shares. When I permit re-
negotiation of input costs, my counterfactual predictions get reversed. Specifically, my analysis 
reveal that the merging firms realize lower costs due to their higher bargaining power with 
upstream content creators. The merging entity passes through some of these input cost savings to 
the end consumer, resulting in prices for its bundles dropping by around -$2.02. On the other 
hand, competing distributors who  do not benefit from higher bargaining power, and thereby 
lower input costs, experience a degradation in their profits relative to their observed profit levels 
should   the counterfactual merger not be approved. Consequently,  merging parties’ profits
increase as does consumer welfare. Comparing my predictions with the baseline counterfactual 
scenario, suggests that ignoring re-negotiation in merger analysis for vertical contracting 
industries can unknowingly underestimate the total welfare impact of proposed mergers. Lastly, I 
allow for mergers to alter the vertical contracting outcomes as well as the end-consumer price 
and quality of cable providers’ product bundles. I find that the Comcast- TWC merger would 
have resulted in deterioration of the quality of cable bundles offered to end consumers. However, 
the accompanying price reduction following the merger more than offset the adverse effect 
of tempered quality provisioning. This result stems from households being more sensitive to 




The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows. Section 1.3 describes the institutional 
features of the U.S. multichannel television industry that make it  suitable for studying my 
research questions. Section 1.4 proceeds with the overview of related literature and my 
contribution. I introduce the data used  in my analysis in Section 1.5. I present some model-free 
evidence in Section 1.6 that provides an initial motivation for my formal empirical analysis. In 
sections 1.7 and 1.8, I describe my equilibrium demand and supply framework, elaborate on 
the details of the empirical model specification, and discuss identification of the structural 
parameters and choice of the instrumental variables. Section 1.9 presents estimation results 
from demand, supply and bargaining models. Section 1.10 follows up with the results from my 
counterfactual experiment, in which I simulate a proposed merger. Section 1.11 concludes and 
offers some potential directions for future research. 
1.3 Overview of the U.S. Multichannel Television Industry 
The U.S. multichannel TV industry is quite complicated and connects various content 
creators, content distributors and consumers. Figure 1 shows a simplified structure of the 
industry. Herein, content creators/suppliers like ESPN and MTV license their content to 
downstream cable system operators, which in turn distribute this content to their cable 
subscribers in their respective franchise areas. 
Cable providers serve exclusive franchise areas, and content creators strive to obtain 
channel space on as many cable systems as possible in order to maximize their viewing  
audience. Content creators may also reach consumers through alternative forms of distribution, 
such as subscription master antenna television (SMARTV), digital satellite systems (DSS), and 
online streaming service like Netflix/ Hulu/ Disney Plus/ Apple TV etc. Cable television is 




dominant during the time period covered by my data. If a cable operator  refuses to carry a 
program service, the service loses an important source of distribution. Operators are aware of 
their control over the supplier’s access to consumers, and it is this control that may give large 
operators an advantage in negotiations with upstream content creators. 
End-consumers pay cable providers monthly subscription fees for the cable bundle they 
purchase. The cable provider in turn pays a bilaterally negotiated affiliate (input) fees to the 
upstream content creator (a price per subscriber per month) so as to have the  rights to 
distribute their content to the cable provider’s end-consumers. Content creators include 
premium networks (Starz, Showtime, etc.), cable networks (ESPN, Disney Channel, etc.), 
regional sports networks (Fox Sports Florida, NBC Sports California, etc.), and  broadcast 
networks (ABC, CBS, etc.). Content creators also realize additional rents from  advertising 
(except for premium networks which tend to be void of advertising). Recently, there has 
been notable consolidation on all levels of the U.S. multichannel television ecosystem: 
between content distributors (AT&T and DirecTV in 2015), between content creators (Disney 
and Fox in 2019), and between content creators and content distributors (Comcast and NBC 
Universal in 2013). Moreover, we are likely to see even more mergers being proposed in this 
industry in the upcoming years, especially due to disruption of the traditional television by 
alternative video services (subscription-based: Hulu, Netflix, Amazon Prime, etc., ad-supported: 
YouTube, Facebook, etc., paid downloads: Google Play, iTunes, etc.). This makes my analysis 
timely and practical for academic researchers interested in effects of mergers in vertically 






Figure 1.1: Multichannel Television Industry 
 
1.4 Related Literature 
This paper contributes to several strands of literature. First and foremost, it is a part of   
the literature on mergers. Secondly, this paper contributes to the literature on endogenous 
product choice. Finally, this paper is also related to empirical and theoretical literature on quality 
provisioning in vertically integrated markets. 
1.4.1 Merger Analysis 
Papers in this section are plentiful and have typically studied the effects of mergers on  
welfare through price changes only. Baker and Bresnahan (1985) estimated the demand 
system, the relationship between prices and quantities, that merger partners will face.  
Werden and Froeb (1994) also predicted the effects of mergers, focusing on prices and welfare. 
Nevo (2000), Ivaldi and McCullough (2010) simulated post-merger price equilibria in industries 
with differentiated products. Hausman, Leonard, and Zona (1994) evaluated  the effects of a 




other brands that these firms produce. Town (2001) looked at the price and welfare implications 
of mergers in industries that are inputs to the final consumption good.  
Price effects manifest themselves in two ways. On one hand, greater efficiencies result in 
lower prices: mergers produce savings by allowing the merged firms to reduce costs, eliminate 
duplicate functions, or achieve scale economies. On the other hand, greater market power 
results in higher prices: mergers increase concentration and give a seller the ability to profitably 
maintain prices above competitive levels for a significant period of time. 
This paper adds to the existing literature by showing that focusing solely on price ef fects 
and ignoring characteristics adjustments is detrimental for merger analysis. Failure  to account 
for quality changes can be a serious omission when investigating the welfare  effects of a 
merger. This becomes especially important in vertically contracted industries where mergers can 
influence outcomes of bargaining between upstream and downstream firms, resulting in 
changed input costs as well as prices and quality levels. 
Similar to price effects, quality changes can also go in either direction. Greater 
efficiencies result in higher quality: a merged firm realizes substantially lower marginal 
costs than did either of its constituent firms before the merger due to increased bargaining power 
with content creators and, as a result, can include more expensive channels.  At the same 
time, greater market power results in lower quality: a merged firm faces less  competition 
and can easier reduce product quality without losing customers. However, firms do not make 
decisions regarding their prices and quality levels separately, instead  they decide on these 
two variable simultaneously.  If a merger leads to higher prices  and lower quality - 
consumers suffer; if prices drop while quality increases as a result of the deal - consumers 




and lower quality, the implications for consumer welfare  are uncertain and will depend on 
the relative distribution of preference for quality and price sensitivity. In my analysis I take 
into account heterogeneity in preferences for both  price and quality in order to address an 
outcome of a merger in vertically contracted industry. 
Outcomes of Actual Mergers 
Another established stream of research on mergers has taken an ex-post approach by 
analyzing outcomes of actual mergers. Borenstein (1990) studies the effects of two airline 
mergers in 1986 that resulted in airport dominance and created substantial market power. Berry 
and Waldfogel (2001) document the effect of radio station mergers induced by the 1996 
Telecommunications Act on product variety. Focarelli and Panetta (2003) find that  although 
consolidation in the banking industry did generate adverse price changes, these changes were 
temporary. George (2007) examines the effect of ownership concentration on product position, 
product variety and readership in markets for daily newspapers.  Chandra and Collard-
Wexler (2009) find that greater concentration, caused by a spate of  mergers in the Canadian 
newspaper industry in the late 1990s, did not lead to higher prices for either newspaper 
subscribers or advertisers. 
However, ex-post analysis does not always tell us whether a proposed deal is going to be 
welfare improving (and should be allowed) or will hurt consumers (and should  be 
blocked). Understanding potential implications of mergers before they take place is  
important for marketing decision makers as well as policy makers who seek to review the 
proposed downstream mergers or to regulate upstream price discrimination.  This paper takes 
a structural approach that allows one to evaluate likely outcomes of a merger on both upstream 




Endogenous Product Choice 
A series of recent papers have recognized the importance of endogenizing product 
characteristics for merger analysis. Draganska, Mazzeo, and Seim (2009) acknowledges that 
abstracting from product characteristics adjustments has consequences for the accuracy of 
merger simulations. Thus, it incorporates endogenous product choice into differentiated product 
demand estimation and discusses how this can potentially be incorporated into merger analysis. 
However, in their model, the authors allow firms to choose from a predetermined set of  
potential products to offer and select the optimal subset of products among this potential set. 
Conversely, in my paper, firms change the quality of existing products instead of changing 
the composition of products. This becomes especially important in industries, where adjusting 
the variety of products in the short run is not possible. More importantly, I introduce another key 
feature: negotiations between content creators (channels) and content distributors (TV providers) 
over programming costs and two-sidedness of the upstream market. This addition is major, 
because mergers are known to change the outcomes of bargaining between producers and 
distributors, which  in turn can influence input costs and the ultimate impact on consumers. 
Fan (2013) develops a structural model of a two-sided newspaper market to analyze the 
effects of ownership consolidation, taking into account not only firms’ price adjustments but also 
the repositioning of newspaper characteristics. The author finds  that ignoring adjustments of 
product characteristics causes substantial differences in estimated effects of a merger. Jeziorski 
(2013) complements Fan (2013), which allows for a richer model of characteristics choice, but 
does not observe advertising quantities. This allows Jeziorski (2013) to study post-
repositioning adjustments in advertising quantity  and find that listener surplus increased 




content is created not by downstream, but by upstream firms instead. I account for a two-
sidedness of the upstream market and  allow for merger-induced re-negotiations between 
upstream and downstream players that allow downstream firms to change product 
characteristics. 
Other papers that incorporated endogenous product provisioning are by Mazzeo (2002) and 
Crawford and Shum (2006). The former study proposes an empirical model to analyze 
product differentiation in oligopolies, while the latter measure the econometric and  
economic consequences of endogenous quality choice by a multiproduct monopolist. I 
extend this stream of research by introducing endogenous product choice to merger 
analysis. 
1.4.2 Quality Provisioning in Multichannel Television Industry 
Last but not least, this paper adds to the literature on quality provisioning in television 
industry. This huge industry is undergoing significant transformation and has recently attracted 
researchers’ attention on its own, especially the quality aspect of it. Liu, Putler and Weinberg 
(2004) present a model of broadcasters’ competitive behavior, in which broadcasters compete by 
selecting the type of program to offer and the quality level of their program. The authors 
find that, depending on the cost of quality provision, broadcasters in industries with a greater 
number of competitors may set lower-quality levels compared to broadcasters in industries with 
fewer competitors. Goolsbee and Petrin (2004) examine direct broadcast satellites (DBS) as a 
competitor to cable and find that without DBS entry cable prices would be higher and cable 
quality would fall. Chu (2010) also studies the effect of satellite entry on cable television prices 
and product  quality and concludes that even though satellite entry typically causes cable firms to 




and quality or by lowering both price and quality.  
I build my model off the industry model introduced by Crawford and Yurukoglu (2012). 
In this research, authors estimate a structural model of viewership, demand,  pricing, 
bundling, and input-market bargaining in order to study another important as pect of the 
multichannel television industry - bundling of TV channels. Doudchenko and Yurukoglu 
(2016) slightly modify the above mentioned model and use it to quantify how  bargaining 
power derived from firm size affects the analysis of downstream mergers. Crawford et al.   
(2018) use a similar setting to analyze the impact of simulated vertical mergers and 
divestitures on competition and welfare. Crawford, Shcherbakov, and Shum (2019) measure 
the welfare distortions from endogenous quality choice (quality overprovision and quality 
degradation) in imperfectly competitive markets. 
1.4.3 Bargaining in Vertical Markets 
This paper also contributes to research on bargaining in vertical markets with multiple  
upstream and downstream firms. In vertical markets (ex. healthcare, multichannel television, 
consumer goods), upstream firms (hospitals, TV channels, food producers) reach final 
consumers through downstream firms (health insurers, cable and satellite companies, grocery 
stores). Ghili (2021) provides a model of endogenous product formation, bargaining, and pricing 
in the context of health insurance. This paper deviates from conventional Nash bargaining 
framework and allows the downstream firm to threaten to replace a currently participating 
upstream firm with a currently non-participating one. In a similar way, Hristakeva (2021) uses a 
Nash-Bargaining solution to study replacement threats in a retail setting. However, existing 
papers on vertical industries do not address merger implications for negotiations and 




change outcomes of bargaining between upstream and downstream firms and, consequently, 
prices and quality of products offered to end consumers. 
1.5 Data 
My data are two-fold, namely: 1) market data, which measures households’  purchasing 
decisions or firms’ production decisions, and 2) viewership data, also called  ratings, which 
measures household’s utilization of the cable channels available to them. My market data 
comes from SNL Kagan. SNL Kagan produces the Economics of Basic Cable Networks 
yearly (EBCN). EBCN provides data at the level of channels on a variety of revenue, cost, 
subscriber quantities and affiliation to channel networks and TV providers. SNL Kagan also 
collects data at the TV provider level on cable and satellite systems’  bundle composition, the 
prices of their bundles and the number of quarterly subscribers per bundle. TV providers 
typically offer two types of bundles: buy-through and add-on. Households that buy add-on
bundles (for example, movie packages, sports packages or digital packages) must first 
purchase any of the buy-through bundles. In this paper, I do  not model households’ choices 
of add-on bundles and will solely focus on buy-through bundles. 
1.5.1 SNL Kagan Data - TV Providers 
My SNL sample spans the quarterly time period of 2013Q1 - 2018Q1. Table 1.1 below 
provides summary statistics for SNL Kagan Data.  Within these data, an observation is a 
provider-bundle-market-quarter, e.g., Verizon’s Extreme HD package in Kent County in 
Philadelphia, PA in 2013Q1. I analyze about 421,000 observations from 13 providers 
(AT&T, Bright House Networks, Cable One, Cablevision Systems, Charter 
Communications, Comcast, Cox Communications, DIRECTV, DISH Network, Spectrum, 




Counties (within  205 Designated Market Areas). Even though there are typically smaller 
local providers in markets, these 13 biggest operators serve an average of 70% of TV 
subscribers in these markets. For these operators and their bundles, Table 1.1 contains 
descriptive statistics on key elements I will consider in the empirical analysis that follows, 
namely: prices, market shares and number of channels for each cable provider. The average 
bundle in my data costs approximately $71.20 and offers about 77 cable channels. 
Prices are monthly subscription fees paid to TV providers by the consumers of the final 
goods. Prices come from several sources, including SNL, manual searches on the Internet 
archive, newspaper archives, and archives of service providers’ rate cards. Prices in my dataset 
do not include any taxes, additional fees, or regional surcharges. Satellite operators (DIRECTV 
and DISH Network) set prices uniformly at the national level, while cable systems make pricing 
decisions locally. Likewise, there is variation in the composition  of bundles across markets 
and over time. Generally, bigger bundles include all channels from smaller bundles plus 
additional channels. Table 1.2 presents a set of channels and denotes the fraction of bundles 
that carry that channel. 
Table 1.1: SNL Kagan Summary Statistics 
 
 Mean SD Min Max 
# of Firms (per Market) 1.79 0.97 1 7 
# of Bundles (per Market) 9.19 6.65 1 38 
# of Bundles (per Firm) 6.29 3.34 2 11 
# of Markets Served (per Firm) 5831.36 5462.65 294 16436 
 
Market Shares (Bundles) 0.02 0.04 8e−07 0.59 
Market Shares (Firms) 0.11 0.10 3e−06 0.91 
Market Shares (Outside Good) 0.80 0.13 0.09 1 
 
Price (of a Bundle) 71.17 31.82 12.99 161.99 
# of Channels (in a Bundle) 76.75 40.62 1 172 





For example, Disney Channel is carried by the majority of bundles (0.736), while Sony 
Movie Channel is offered by only select bundles (0.038). Table 1.3 below contains additional 
descriptive statistics of prices, market shares and number of channels for each provider. 
1.5.2 Economics of Basic Cable Networks - Channels 
TV channels include broadcast networks, cable networks, and special-interest networks. 
Broadcast networks are television signals transmitted in the local cable market. Examples 
include the major national broadcast networks (ABC, CBS, NBC, and FOX) and public and 
independent television stations. Cable networks are advertising-supported general and 
special- interest networks distributed nationally, such as MTV, CNN, and ESPN. Premium 
networks are advertising-free entertainment networks, typically offering full-length feature 
films, such as HBO and Showtime. Economics of Basic Cable Networks (EBCN) provides 
information on over 200 cable channels. A cable network’s revenue is  generated from 
negotiated license fees that TV providers pay them as well as advertising. EBCN includes 
license fee revenue, advertising revenue, ownership, and total number of subscribers to 
channels. All these variables are recorded on a yearly basis.  
Table 1.2: Channel Summary Statistics 
 
Cable System Carriage     Household Viewership 
(1)  (2) 
 Mean % SD % Mean Rating SD Rating 
C-SPAN 0.889 0.163 0.014 0.005 
The Weather Channel 0.747 0.131 0.174 0.025 
Discovery Channel 0.737 0.149 0.444 0.042 
Disney Channel 0.736 0.155 0.969 0.266 
Lifetime Television 0.722 0.149 0.363 0.042 
USA 0.722 0.113 0.793 0.165 
CNN 0.702 0.135 0.480 0.152 
A&E 0.691 0.151 0.464 0.097 




ESPN 0.665 0.139 0.684 0.162 
Golf Channel 0.487 0.170 0.109 0.025 
Oxygen 0.477 0.178 0.188 0.043 
BBC America 0.447 0.170 0.125 0.024 
CBS Sports Network 0.416 0.206 0.037 0.011 
Nick Jr 0.399 0.209 0.320 0.096 
Science 0.387 0.150 0.216 0.026 
Bloomberg Television 0.378 0.209 0.024 0.009 
ESPNews 0.346 0.181 0.070 0.025 
Cooking Channel 0.314 0.155 0.097 0.009 
Disney Jr 0.305 0.180 0.485 0.037 
BET Soul 0.099 0.111 0.014 0.002 
GolTV 0.088 0.109 0.042 0.017 
FOROtv 0.085 0.117 0.146 0.048 
MGM 0.069 0.090 0.112 0.023 
NickMusic 0.065 0.116 0.007 0.001 
World Fishing Network 0.061 0.095 0.075 0.026 
BET Her 0.054 0.100 0.073 0.013 
TVG Network 2 0.043 0.089 0.007 0.001 
Sony Movie Channel 0.038 0.093 0.173 0.035 
Chiller 0.031 0.054 0.099 0.022 
 
 
Table 1.3: Descriptive Statistics of the Downstream Market 
Price Market Share # of Channels 
Distributor Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max 
AT&T 90.18 37.49 19.00 157.00 0.04 0.03 9e−05 0.21 96.28 55.64 1 172 
Bright House 60.07 24.95 25.00 90.00 0.15 10.15 2e−05 0.58 51.79 36.24.00 1 126 
Cable One 51.53 19.53 24.00 80.00 0.10 0.07 1e−04 0.42 29.39 21.49 2 64 
Cablevision 67.48 29.95 15.52 109.95 0.15 0.11 1e−05 0.38 74.23 41.65 3 130 
Charter 80.16 16.31 59.99 99.99 0.12 0.09 3e−05 0.78 92.46 26.54 6 139 
Comcast 61.14 32.02 26.95 143.99 0.16 0.12 3e−06 0.73 65.00 40.01 1 144 
Cox 66.40 41.32 21.30 161.99 0.17 0.13 5e−05 0.70 71.85 38.52 1 143 
DIRECTV 73.07 8.50 61.00 83.00 0.03 0.01 1e−03 0.16 66.07 13.97 46 78 
Dish 70.18 28.86 29.99 149.99 0.09 0.04 2e−03 0.35 79.49 33.75 21 153 
Spectrum 76.72 24.55 21.00 104.99 0.13 0.10 1e−05 0.79 91.43 42.07 1 155 
TWC 59.86 27.36 20.99 87.99 0.18 0.12 9e−6 0.91 53.14 39.10 1 128 
Verizon 63.28 23.02 12.99 89.99 0.13 0.08 6e−05 0.42 90.03 49.26 6 159 





The input cost for a channel is its license fee revenue divided by the number of subscribers. 
This measures how much distributors are paying for the channel per subscriber, averaged across 
distributors. The per-subscriber advertising rate is a channel’s total advertising revenue divided 
by the number of subscribers. It measures on average, how much a channel earns from 
advertisers per household subscribed to that channel. 
Table 1.4 presents the mean and standard deviations of the average input costs and per-
subscriber advertising rates for a sample of channels (Ten channels are selected from the most 
popular ones, 10 from the least popular ones and 10 from the middle). For convenience, both 
input costs and advertising rates are calculated on a monthly basis. For instance, the average 
input cost for all channels is $0.23/ subscriber/ month. ESPN is the most expensive channel, 
costing TV providers $6.66/ subscriber/ month. Likewise, ESPN also makes more money from 
advertising ($2.30/ subscriber/ month) than any other channel with the average being $0.16/ 
subscriber/ month. 
1.5.3 Viewership Data 
My viewership data comes from Nielsen DMA Tuning Data. This database reports the 
viewing behavior for all adult members of a household. Within the Nielsen Data, a rating 
is the percentage of households with at least one television viewing the programming on that 
channel. Ratings are calculated monthly on a national level. Table 1.2 presents the average 
ratings for the sample of channels in my analysis.  
Additionally, I collect yearly data on income for all counties from the US Census Bureau. 
In those markets households earn between $18,972 and $129,588, with an average income of 







Table 1.4: Channel Summary Statistics, cont. 
                                                                       Affiliate Fee                Advertising Revenue 
  (1)                              (2) 
 Mean Cost SD Cost Mean Rate SD Rate 
C-SPAN 0.060 0 0 0 
The Weather Channel 0.142 0.008 0.161 0.016 
Discovery Channel 0.418 0.018 0.608 0.066 
Disney Channel 1.380 0.180 0.179 0.014 
Lifetime Television 0.340 0.016 0.534 0.029 
USA 0.990 0.072 1.058 0.052 
CNN 0.666 0.078 0.387 0.046 
A&E 0.310 0.016 0.463 0.038 
TBS 0.810 0.148 1.086 0.106 
ESPN 6.664 0.910 2.302 0.353 
Golf Channel 0.350 0.027 0.198 0.009 
Oxygen 0.156 0.011 0.174 0.019 
BBC America 0.104 0.005 0.137 0.035 
CBS Sports Network 0.256 0.015 0.132 0.013 
Nick Jr 0.248 0.019 0.046 0.003 
Science 0.086 0.015 0.131 0.016 
Bloomberg Television 0.074 0.005 0.165 0.010 
ESPNews 0.250 0.032 0.097 0.009 
Cooking Channel 0.092 0.008 0.108 0.033 
Disney Jr 0.166 0.023 0 0 
BET Soul 0.058 0.004 0.021 0.002 
GolTV 0.148 0.008 0.032 0.004 
FOROtv 0.200 0.016 0.044 0.010 
MGM 0.468 0.015 0 0 
NickMusic 0.022 0.004 0.005 0.001 
World Fishing Network 0.132 0.004 0 0 
BET Her 0.094 0.009 0 0 
TVG Network 2 0 0 0 0 
Sony Movie Channel 0.352 0.019 0 0 
Chiller 0.104 0.009 0.052 0.003 
 
1.5.4 Quality Measure 
For this study it becomes critical to define and quantify product quality.  However, the 




bundle as the sum of ratings of all channels included in that bundle.  This measure is 
increasing in the number of channels but also accounts for the differences in channel  
composition of bundles. Bundles that consist entirely of channels with unknown or zero 
ratings are assigned a quality score of 0.001, which is approximately three times smaller  than 
the rating of the lowest-rated channel. 
It is important to note that channel ratings are measured on a monthly basis and are a function 
of the number of views for that channel. Thus, if measured on a monthly level, product quality 
depends on the number of people watching the channel. This becomes problematic when product 
quality enters as an independent variable a demand equation, where a dependent variable 
(market shares) also depends on the number of subscribers.  In order to mitigate this, I measure 
the quality of a channel as an average Nielsen Rating across time periods observed (2013Q1-
2018Q1). 
𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑏𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑙𝑒 = ∑ 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑙
𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑙∈𝑏𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑙𝑒
An alternative approach is to use the national average input costs paid by cable systems 
for those channels instead of their ratings. This follows earlier empirical work by Crawford,
Shcherbakov, and Shum (2019), Shcherbakov (2016), and Chu (2010). The latter also performs 
a robustness check by using Nielsen ratings instead of costs and concludes that  the 
qualitative implications of the estimates are robust to the choice of the measure. The 
reason I use ratings is because ratings are seen as a more logical and understandable  
indicator of quality by final consumers. It is important to note that generally, the most  
carried channels have the highest ratings and the highest affiliate fees and the least carried 
channels have the lowest ratings and the lowest affiliate fees. However, it is not always  the 




between these three variables is not linear and there are examples of channels that have low 
rating but high carriage (ex. C-SPAN), high rating but low carriage (ex. Discovery en 
Espanol), low rating but high affiliate fees (ex. NFL Network), high rating but low affiliate 
fee (ex. Cartoon Network), low carriage but high affiliate fee (ex. MGM),  high carriage but 
low affiliate fee (ex. The Weather Channel). Some channels, even good  ones, are not 
always carried in all markets. If a distributor does not carry a channel  in some of the 
markets, the likely explanation is that in those markets households do not value that channel 
enough for a distributor to pay the affiliate fee for that channel.  Furthermore, it is important 
to note that in this setting the measure of channel quality is  akin to popularity. The “ideal" 
measure of channel quality would be the one provided by external critical reviewers and 
would rate artistic quality of the content offered on the channel instead of popularity. 
However, this measure is not available. 
1.6 Model-free Evidence 
In May 2015, Charter and Time Warner Cable announced that they have reached an 
agreement for the former to acquire the latter in a $78.7 billion deal. Charter also confirmed that 
it would continue with its proposed acquisition of Bright House Networks. The merger  was 
approved by the Department of Justice and FCC in April 2016 and completed in May 
2016. These purchases made Charter the third-largest pay television company in the 
United States, behind AT&T and Comcast. Charter claimed that this deal “will result in  
faster broadband speeds, better video products, including more high definition channels, more 
affordable phone service and more competition, for consumers and businesses”. The merged 
company was re-branded as Spectrum. Figure 1.2 below presents some exploratory evidence 




proposed measure of bundle quality, the sum of the ratings of all channels included in that 
bundle. 
The top row of Figure 1.2 examines Charter’s promise to provide more channels.  In 
brief, even though some markets and some bundles did witness an increase in the 
availability of channels, other markets and bundles experienced the opposite trend. For  three 
major bundles, Select, Silver, and Gold, Figure 1.2 plots the number of channels  included in 
these bundles in three DMAs: Raleigh-Durham, NC (560), Fresno-Visalia, CA (866) and 
Atlanta, GA (524). Raleigh was served by both Time Warner Cable and Charter  prior to the 
merger, Fresno was served by Bright House as well as Charter, while Atlanta  was served by 
Charter only. The evidence suggests that Atlanta has seen a decrease in the number of 
channels for all bundles stemming from this deal. In Fresno, the number of channels 
significantly increased around the time the deal took place. In that market,  the merger indeed 
resulted in an increase in availability of HD channels, but also brought  about a big dip in the 
interim. Raleigh experienced a drop in the number of channels, which eventually rebounded 
a year after the deal took place. 
The bottom row of Figure 1.2 plots the quality dynamics for these three bundles in  the 
three above-mentioned markets. The quality measure reflects bundle composition weighted 
by ratings of TV channels. In Atlanta, the quality of bundles did not significantly change. In 
Raleigh, this merger brought a decrease in quality of low and middle-tier bundles. In Fresno, 
the upward peak in the number of channels coincided with a peak in quality, while the drop 
in the number of channels was not associated with a significant decrease in quality. This 
could mean that Charter was removing unpopular HD channels that did not cause quality 




While the number of channels and bundle quality change repeatedly, price changes  less 
frequently. Select, Silver and Gold bundles were priced in these markets at $59.99, 
$79.99 and $99.99 each respectively before 2016Q1 and at $64.99, $84.99 and $104.99 after 
2016Q1. Key take-aways are as follows. First of all, not only price but also quality exhibits a 
noticeable change resulting from a merger. Secondly, quality changes are different in different 
markets. Thirdly, even in markets where only one merging party was present pre-merger, that 
party changes composition of its bundles post-merger. 
1.7 The Industry Model 
The industry model predicts 1) household demand for multichannel television services, 
2) price and composition of bundles offered by distributors, and 3) distributor-channel specific 
input costs. 
In stage 1, channels and distributors negotiate the input costs bilaterally; in stage 2, 
distributors set the price and composition of bundles; in stage 3, households choose from among 
available bundles. I start solving my model from the last stage and work backwards. 
Consider a market t, served by downstream firms f , each offering multiple bundles 
indexed by j ∈ J f t. For simplicity, t denotes both county and time. 
1.7.1 Demand: Bundle Purchases 
There is a continuum of consumers, indexed by i. A household’s choice of cable bundle 
j will depend on bundle’s price pjt, observed quality qjt, as well as other characteristics  of 
the bundle and cable system zjt. The components of zjt include the operator which  is 
offering the bundle, the county in which the bundle is being offered, a year-quarter dummy and 
a bundle name dummy. Observed quality of a bundle reflects an access to  the channels 











Household i’s utility derived from subscribing to bundle j in market t is: 
𝑈𝑖𝑗𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 𝑝𝑗𝑡 +  𝛽𝑖𝑞𝑗𝑡 +  𝑧
′
𝑗𝑡𝛾 +  𝜉𝑗𝑡 𝑖𝑗𝑡  
 







βi = β + Σvi
’ + Dy’i 
 
with yi being a household’s income. Parameters measuring price sensitivity, preference  for 
quality, and system as well as other bundle characteristics are denoted as αi, βi, and γ, 
respectively. This model incorporates both observable (demographics) and unobservable taste 
heterogeneity though random coefficients. D is a matrix of parameters measuring how agents’  
tastes vary with income. Independent draws from the standard normal distribution, v, are scaled 
by a lower triangular matrix Σ, which denotes the Cholesky root of  the covariance matrix for 
unobserved taste heterogeneity. 
An unobserved component, ξjt, is common to all households in the market; eijt is a a 
household specific idiosyncratic term assumed to be i.i.d. drawn from a Type 1 extreme value 
distribution. ξjt represents the deviation of unobserved demand shocks or bundle attributes from 
the operator-county-quarter-bundle mean. These unobserved attributes can include price and 
quality of tied Internet service, availability of high-definition (HD) service, promotional activity, 
technical service, and quality of equipment. Theory predicts that these unobservable attributes 
will be correlated with price and observable quality. Therefore, I will use instrumental variables 
to address the endogeneity issue. 
Let us define δjt  = αpjt + βqjt + z’jtγ + ξjt and µijt  = πpyi pjt + πqyiqjt.   
Then,  the model’s predicted market share for bundle j in market t is 
𝑠𝑗𝑓 = ∫
exp ((𝛿𝑗𝑡 +  µ𝑖𝑗𝑡)




where Ft is the distribution of household preferences and demographics in market t. 
1.7.2 Supply: Downstream Distributors 
Distributors compete by choosing quality (bundle composition) and price for their 
bundles in each market. Operator f in a market t solves the following profit maximization 
problem: 




 𝑠𝑗𝑡(𝑝𝑡 , 𝑞𝑡) 
where J f t stands for a set of bundles offered by this firm f in a market t with corresponding 
prices pjt and qualities qjt; pt and qt are vectors of prices and qualities for all bundles offered by 
all firms in market t. 
The input cost that firm f pays for channel c for every household that receives that 
channel is denoted by τf c. Following the nature of programming contracts in the industry, the 
input costs vary by firm and channel, but not across the markets served by firm. Cjt is a set 
of channels included in the bundle j in market t. I take the number of bundles offered by 
each distributor as given and exogenous to its price and quality decisions. A similar 
assumption is invoked in Olley and Pakes (1996); Ackerberg, Caves and Frazer  (2015); 
Crawford, Shcherbakov and Shum (2019). The model can be thought of as the second stage 
of a larger model in which firms first choose the number of products before choosing the 
quality of each product. Therefore, findings of quality distortion should be interpreted as a 
short-run effect where adjusting the number of products is not possible. 
1.7.3 Supply: Bargaining Between Distributors and Channels 
Upstream channels and downstream distributors meet bilaterally and bargain to 
determine whether to form an agreement, and if so, at what input cost.  As discussed in 
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Crawford and Yurukoglu (2012), payments between distributors and content providers are 
primarily in the form of linear fees; fixed fees are rare, and if they exist, they are typically 
negligible relative to the total payment. These meetings result in an asymmetric   Nash 
bargaining solution. In each meeting (separate and simultaneous) τfc maximizes  firm f and 
channel c Nash product: 
NPf c(τf c; τ− f c) = [Π f (τf c) − Π f (∞, τ− f c)]
ζ f c [Πc(τf c) − Πc(∞, τ− f c)]
1−ζf c , 
where Π f is firm f ’s profit and Πc is a profit of channel c: 
Πc(τf c; τ− f c) = ∑[τf c Qf c(τ) + rct
ad Qf c(τ)] 
where Q f c is the total number of subscribers to channel c coming from distributor f and 𝑟𝑐
𝑎𝑑 
is the advertising revenue per household subscribed to that channel. 
The payoffs are determined by downstream competition at the agreed input costs.  If 
there is no agreement between a distributor and a channel, then that input cost is positive 
infinity and that channel is dropped from all bundles. Π f (∞, τ− f c) and Πc(∞, τ− f c) are 
firm’s and channel’s profits when channel c is dropped from the bundle. Disagreement 1) 
changes demand for firm f ’s bundles in all markets where it carried channel c and 2) decreases 
the marginal costs of f  in those markets as it no longer pays τfc. Likewise, channel c 1) loses the 
input fees from firm f as well as advertising revenue generated by  f ’s subscribers. On the other 
hand, 2) the demand for other distributors that still carry channel c increases which has an 
offsetting effect on both channel’s input cost revenues and advertising revenues. 
The bargaining parameter of distributor f when meeting channel c is denoted as   ζ fc; 
the bargaining parameter of a channel in this meeting is 1 − ζ f c. My specification, contrary to 
Ghili (2021), does not need to accommodate fixed costs that cable distributors (downstream 
providers) incur for each channel (upstream firm) included in the T.V. bundles (network). 
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Ghili (2021) uses these costs to explain why certain upstream firms are excluded or included 
from downstream firm’s network and not replaced by another upstream firm. My work uses a 
different approach, Nash Bargaining formulation, where  inclusion and exclusion of upstream 
firms is rationalized by downstream firm’s outside  option profit, equal to the maximum 
profit downstream firm could attain by severing the link with an upstream firm. 
1.8 Estimation and Identification 
First, I estimate demand parameters (α, β, γ, Σ, P ) and then use them to separately estimate a 
parameterized cost function that for each pair of distributor f and channel c predicts input 
cost τf c. Finally, given estimated demand and cost parameters, the bargaining model picks out 
the bargaining parameters ζ f c for each pair that induce the estimated set of input costs in 
equilibrium. 
1.8.1 Instruments 
There is an endogeneity problem, since TV distributors observe realizations of unobserved 
product characteristics, ξ, prior to making their pricing and quality decisions. Thus, price and 
quality are likely to be correlated with local demand shocks. First, I assume that a bundle’s 
price in the following year is a valid instrument for a price of  that bundle in the current 
year. Households are taking into account current prices when making purchasing decisions and 
thus, future prices are unlikely to be correlated with current demand shocks. Next-year prices are 
a reasonable proxy for present prices since both are set by the a corresponding distributor for the 
same products. Secondly, I use average quality of the same bundle in the other DMAs as an 
instrument for quality in a local market. The exclusion restriction is satisfied, since consumers 
cannot purchase a product offered in a different market, even if it is of a higher quality than in 
their local market. 
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This instrument is also relevant, since product line differentiation across markets is  
similar for the same firm. For instance, AT&T’s U-300 bundle has a higher quality than U-
200 everywhere, but the quality of U-300 in Charlotte, NC is different from the quality of U-
300 in Sacramento, CA. For these instruments to be valid, the unobservable demand shocks ξ 
must be uncorrelated across markets and time periods. For instance, this would be a concern if 
cable operators were advertising their products nationally or if demand shocks were 
persistent. Table 1.5 bellow provides a reduced form evidence in favor of  these price and 
quality instruments. 




Constant 0.121∗∗∗(0.008) 1.409∗∗(0.001) 
R2 0.904 0.405 
corr 0.951 0.634 
* p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01 
 
1.8.2  Demand Parameters Estimation 
Given values of Σ and P, the first step is to compute δjt in each market which equates 
observed market shares with predicted market shares using the contraction mapping (Berry, 
Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995)). 
δjt ← δjt + log sjt − log sjt (δ, Σ, P) 
Given δjt, we can estimate α, β, and γ by linear instrumental variable regression. Then, the 
unobserved product characteristics can be computed as residuals and interacted with the 
instruments to form a GMM objective function. Finally, a nonlinear optimizer finds  Σ  and P 
that minimize the GMM objective function. 
1.8.3 Cost Parameters Estimation 
I parameterize input cost τf c as a function of channel and firm characteristics: 
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τ̂ f c(η, φ) = (η1 + η2τc) ∗ exp(φ1SUBS f + φ2V I f c), 
where τc is the observed Kagan average input cost for channel c, SUBS f is a firm’s total 
number of subscribers and VI f c is a vertical integration status of channel c and firm f . Input 
costs are identified by national average input costs and the observed prices and  bundles. A 
weighted average of τf c over firms predicts the national-average input cost for each channel c. 
The EBCN dataset’s channel input costs, τc, are the empirical counterpart of these averages. 
The first moment condition ensures that predicted aggregate input costs equal observed 
aggregate input costs: 
𝐸[?̂?𝑓𝑐(𝜂, 𝜑) −  𝜏𝑐] = 0 
The second moment condition states that implied marginal costs, recovered from the 





− ∑ ?̂?𝑓𝑐(𝜂, 𝜑)) = 0
𝑐∈𝐶𝑗𝑡
 
The third moment condition says that there are only certain cost parameters which satisfy the 
adding or dropping of channels as less profitable than keeping the observed bundle  
compositions. In other words, firm f ’s profits are higher for its chosen observed bundles and 






(𝑏, 𝑏′) = 0 
Each moment condition is weighted equally in the estimation. As a result of this 
estimation,  I  recover  firm-channel  specific  costs,  τ̂ f c  unobserved  in  the  data  but  necessary  
for estimation of bargaining parameters. 
1.8.4 Bargaining Parameter Estimation 
Unobserved parameters of the bargaining game are distributor-channel pairwise bargaining 
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parameters ζ f c. Bargaining parameters ζ f c are identified by estimated pair-specific costs, 
demand parameters and the protocol of a bargaining game. I choose ζ f c that minimizes the 
distance between the bargaining model’s input costs and estimated input costs. Thus, for a 
fixed vector of ζc, bargaining model produces a vector of input costs that is as close as 
possible to input costs we have recovered from supply. 
In order to solve for equilibrium input costs (find which ones from the vector will be 
realized in the equilibrium), I compute, for each potential input cost, the payoffs  for 
upstream and downstream firms: the quality of bundles, the number of subscribers 
downstream firms’ pricing decisions, channel’s input cost revenue, and advertising revenue. 
∀ f , ∀C, equilibrium input costs τf c maximize the bargaining Nash product from the bargaining 
model, given estimated demand parameters. Equilibrium bargaining parameters are 
parameters that will correspond to the vector of equilibrium input costs. 
Identification of the bargaining parameters relies on 1) ability to estimate pair-specific input 
costs and 2) assumption that the marginal costs of channels being zero. These two key points 
allow us to separately estimate bargaining parameters from costs.  I allow bargaining 
parameters to be between 0 and 1, where setting a bargaining parameter to   zero is equivalent 
to assuming Nash-Bertrand pricing by channels. 
1.9 Results 
1.9.1 Demand Model Estimates 
Table 1.6 below presents estimates of price-sensitivity parameter (α), preferences for quality 
parameter (β), observable (income) taste heterogeneity parameters (D), and unobservable taste 
heterogeneity parameters (Σ). Price coefficient is significantly negative and quality coefficient 





Table 1.6: Price Sensitivity and Quality Preference Parameters    
                                                Parameter           Estimate Standard error 
  Price Coefficient 
Mean               −4.35∗∗∗                              7.32e-02 
1/Income               −1.02e
−03∗∗∗                        3.47e
−06
 
                                                     Quality Coefficient 
Mean 0.28∗∗∗                                  1.72
−02 





Fixed effects: Product, Firm, DMA, Time 
Prices and Qualities are in logarithms 
 
 
Σ  1 Price Quality               
1 1.07∗∗∗(1.07e−02) 
Price 0.75∗∗∗(5.74e−02) 0.41∗∗∗(1.87e−02) 
Quality 0.16∗∗∗(2.16e−02) −0.73∗∗(2.43e−02) 0.11∗∗∗(1.48e−02) 
 
* p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01 
 
Households with higher income are less price sensitive and more quality sensitive, which is 
consistent with TV bundle being a normal good. There is significant unobserved heterogeneity in 
price sensitivity and preferences for quality and outside good. 
Figure 1.3 summarizes distribution of mean own price elasticities, mean own quality 
elasticities as well as aggregate price elasticities and aggregate quality elasticities. Mean 
elasticities are computed for each product in each market and then stacked. Aggregate elasticities 
are computed for each market and reflect the change in total sales of all inside goods under  a 
proportional sales tax of some factor. Mean own elasticities are larger in magnitude  than 
aggregate elasticities, which suggests that demand for an entire product category is less 
elastic than the average elasticity of individual products. In terms of substitution patterns, this 
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means that consumers are more likely to switch to another inside good than to an outside option. 
Average own price elasticities are equal to -4.06, which is consistent with previous estimates in 
literature (The FCC (2002): -2.19, Goolsbee and Petrin (2004): -3.2, Crawford and Yurukoglu (2012): -4.12).  
Figure 1.3: Distribution of Price and Quality Elasticities 
 
 
Table 1.7: Own and Cross-Price Elasticities in Orange County, Raleigh-Durham , NC (560) 
2014Q4 
 U-basic U200 U300 U450 Gold Select Silver Broadcast Digital Standard 
U-basic -3.495 0.021 0.031 0.017 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.465 0.353 0.161 
U200 0.003 -4.977 0.169 0.061 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.022 1.554 0.367 
U300 0.003 0.109 -4.928 0.061 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.021 1.570 0.369 
U450 0.004 0.098 0.154 -4.909 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.031 1.430 0.351 
Gold 0.004 0.107 0.169 0.060 -5.084 0.001 0.001 0.022 1.55 0.367 
Select 0.003 0.108 0.170 0.061 0.001 -5.097 0.001 0.022 1.567 0.369 
Silver 0.003 0.109 0.172 0.061 0.000 0.000 -5.103 0.022 1.575 0.370 
Broadcast 0.055 0.016 0.024 0.013 0.000 0.000 0.000 -2.795 0.278 0.136 
Digital 0.004 0.104 0.163 0.059 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.026 -3.534 0.361 
Standard 0.006 0.087 0.137 0.051 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.045 1.285 -4.491 
U-basic, U200, U300, U450 are provided by AT&T 
Select, Gold, Silver are provided by Charter 





Table 1.7 depicts own and cross-price elasticities for all products in Orange County, 
Raleigh-Durham, NC (560) in 2014Q4. Generally, if price for a product changes,  consumers 
are more likely to switch to the market leaders, or else to another product provided by the same 
distributor and in the similar tier. For example, the closest substitutes for U300 (middle-tier 
bundle by AT&T) are Standard by TWC, Digital by TWC, then U200 by AT&T. The closest 
substitutes for U450 (top-tier bundle by AT&T) are Standard and Digital by TWC, then U300 
by AT&T. Table 1.8 below shows own and cross-quality elasticities for all products in the 
same market. The substitution patterns are similar to those for price. As seen in the table, there is 
heterogeneity in the distribution of elasticities for different products across markets.  
Predominantly, top-tier bundles (e.g. U450 by AT&T, Gold by Charter, Digital by TWC), 
are less price and quality sensitive than low-tier bundles (e.g. U200 by AT&T, Select by 
Charter, Standard by TWC). 
Table 1.8: Own and Cross-Quality Elasticities in Orange County, Raleigh-Durham, NC 
(560) 2014Q4 
 
 U-basic U200 U300 U450 Gold Select Silver Broadcast Digital Standard 
U-basic 0.108 -0.007 -0.008 -0.005 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.011 -0.012 -0.053 
U200 -0.001 0.418 -0.016 -0.054 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.005 -0.141 -0.319 
U300 -0.001 -0.101 0.415 -0.055 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.006 -0.143 -0.322 
U450 -0.002 -0.088 -0.013 0.399 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.008 -0.127 -0.296 
Gold -0.001 -0.099 -0.015 -0.054 0.428 -0.000 -0.001 -0.005 -0.141 -0.319 
Select -0.001 -0.100 -0.016 -0.055 -0.000 0.430 -0.001 -0.005 -0.143 -0.322 
Silver -0.001 -0.101 -0.015 -0.055 -0.000 -0.000 0.432 -0.005 -0.144 -0.323 
Broadcast -0.012 -0.004 -0.006 -0.003 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.680 -0.071 -0.034 
Digital -0.001 -0.095 -0.014 -0.052 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.006 0.283 -0.310 
Standard -0.002 -0.076 -0.011 -0.043 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.011 -0.110 0.347 
U-basic, U200, U300, U450 are provided by AT&T 
Select, Gold, Silver are provided by Charter 
Broadcast, Standard, Digital are provided by Time Warner Cable 
 




1.9.2 Input Cost Estimates 
Demand estimates combined with Nash pricing and bundling assumption and Kagan 
average input costs provide the following estimates for input cost parameters (see Table 1.9 
below):  
Table 1.9: Input Cost Parameters 
Parameter Estimate Standard error 
Constant 0.001 0.021 







Distributor size is measured in tens of millions of 
households Vertical Integration is a dummy variable 
 
The current specification allows us to recover channel-distributor specific input costs which 
are crucial for estimation of bargaining parameters. The estimates imply that bigger 
distributors have a size advantage over smaller distributors in terms  of lower input costs. 
Moreover, input costs for distributor’s own vertically integrated channels are lower than for 
unaffiliated channels. Thus, merging parties will realize lower input costs due to greater size as 
well as due to an increase in the number of vertically integrated channels these parties jointly 
own. 
1.9.3 Bargaining Parameters Estimates 
Bargaining parameters are estimated for all channel-distributor pairs. Table 1.10 shows 
the estimates of channel-distributor specific bargaining power parameters for the set of channels 
and distributors. Smaller values represent more bargaining power for channels. Correspondingly, 
bigger value represent more bargaining power for distributors. Distributors have higher 
bargaining power than unpopular channels and lower than highly watched channels. For 
instance, ESPN has a bargaining power greater than any provider while any provider has a 
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greater bargaining power than Sony Movie Channel. Among distributors, smaller operators 
generally have lower bargaining parameters than bigger competitors (for example, AT&T has a 
greater subscriber base than Cable One and greater bargaining power with almost all channels). 
1.10     Counterfactual Analysis: Case Study of the Comcast -  Time Warner Cable Merger 
Application 
 
In this section I simulate an attempted merger between Comcast and Time Warner Cable. To 
simulate this merger, I join the merging parties into a new firm, maintaining the number 
of their products offered in each market fixed. In markets, where both firms were present, 
prices are now jointly set by a common owner. I compute counterfactual downstream prices, 
qualities, input fees and market shares for merging parties as well as their competitors. I then 
compute changes in consumer surplus, upstream and downstream profits. 
Table 1.10: Bargaining Parameters 
 Charter AT&
T 
Cable One TWC 
C-SPAN 0.40 0.56 0.26 0.38 
The Weather Channel 0.15 0.32 0.24 0.17 
Discovery Channel 0.06 0.07 0.03 0.05 
Disney Channel 0.12 0.22 0.09 0.10 
Lifetime Television 0.21 0.29 0.30 0.20 
USA 0.16 0.13 0.16 0.08 
CNN 0.19 0.35 0.28 0.34 
A&E 0.43 0.35 0.22 0.38 
TBS 0.09 0.18 0.09 0.17 
ESPN 0.05 0.12 0.04 0.05 
Golf Channel 0.22 0.33 0.19 0.20 
Oxygen 0.28 0.35 0.26 0.30 
BBC America 0.14 0.27 0.19 0.21 
CBS Sports Network 0.33 0.39 0.27 0.34 
Nick Jr 0.47 0.43 0.40 0.41 
Science 0.55 0.65 0.51 0.52 
Bloomberg Television 0.60 0.67 0.54 0.62 
ESPNews 0.49 0.42 0.36 0.47 
Cooking Channel 0.48 0.60 0.66 0.45 
Disney Jr 0.47 0.65 0.37 0.59 
BET Soul 0.18 0.28 0.48 0.30 
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GolTV 0.59 0.67 0.63 0.57 
FOROtv 0.66 0.71 0.64 0.7 
MGM 0.45 0.59 0.54 0.60 
NickMusic 0.43 0.58 0.56 0.49 
World Fishing Network 0.64 0.68 0.66 0.65 
BET Her 0.84 0.85 0.89 0.91 
TVG Network 2 0.94 0.94 0.93 0.92 
Sony Movie Channel 0.86 0.88 0.89 0.82 
Chiller 0.97 0.96 0.93 0.98 
 
 The two central effects in this merger simulation are: (1) merger reduces downstream 
competition in the markets, where merging firms were competing prior to the deal, and 
(2) the merged firms will have greater bargaining power against the channels and will be able 
to negotiate lower input fees due to its size. The first effect tends to increase industry profits and 
decreases consumer welfare. The second effect tends to lower upstream profits, increase 
downstream profits and increase consumer surplus. The net effect of these  two effects is 
ambiguous in theory. 
1.10.1 Brief Background 
It’s all about increasing competition and creating more consumer benefit as a result of 
gaining additional scale. 
 David Cohen, Executive V.P. of Comcast 
 
In February 2014 Comcast announced its intent to acquire Time Warner Cable for $45.2 
billion. The companies argued that the deal would increase their overall scale, allowing   the 
company to become more competitive, improve customer service quality, and quicken 
innovation. 
The merger was widely opposed by various groups, corporations and policy makers, 
arguing that it would reduce competition through consolidation, lead to higher costs of  
service, give Comcast greater leverage in distribution of content owned by its NBC 
Universal division to competitors, and hand Comcast the keys to New York and Los Angeles- 
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two massive markets that it did not already control. 
In March 2014 The Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice officially 
announced that it would be reviewing the merger and in April 2014 the U.S. Department of 
Justice began to file an antitrust lawsuit against Comcast and Time Warner Cable in a bid  to 
halt the merger. In April 24, 2015, Comcast officially announced that it had called off  the 
merger. 
1.10.2 Counterfactual Results 
Following the evolution of the literature on merger analysis, I start with simulating a merger, 
allowing firms to change prices only in the absence of vertical contracting (Case 1). Case 2 
represents a scenario, where merger impacts firms’ bargaining power with channels, but 
composition of bundles (quality) remains intact. Case 3 concludes the simulations by 
incorporating both vertical contracting and endogenous quality choices. Table 1.11 summarizes 
results for all three cases. 
The key takeaway from Case 1 is that if product qualities are fixed and firms are not re-
negotiating input costs following a merger, consumers have to pay higher prices and 
unavoidably loose. On the contrary, profits of merging parties as well as other firms increase, 
despite lower market shares. This is caused by a reduction in competition induced by the 
merger. 
When I introduce re-negotiations of costs (Case 2), the results are pushed in the opposite 
direction. This is caused by greater efficiencies stemming from economies of scale. Merging 
firms realize lower input costs and decrease prices for their offerings (−$2.02).  As a result, 
merging parties’ profits increase as well as consumer welfare. On the contrary, competing firms 
do not realize greater bargaining power or lower costs and cannot afford to drop prices 
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significantly, which results in the loss in their profits. 
Case 3 extends the previous scenario by allowing firms to change composition of their 
bundles. Qualities of products offered by merging parties drop along with the qualities  of 
products offered by competing firms (reduction in the latter is more pronounced). This decrease 
in quality is accompanied by a significant drop in prices set by merging firms (−$4.29) and 
a slight increase in prices set by other distributors (+$0.66). Despite the drop in quality, 
consumer welfare improves. This can be explained by the fact that households are more sensitive 
to changes in prices than to changes in qualities and the decrease in prices offsets the decrease in 
qualities. Interestingly, the merger results in the greater total market share of television. 

























Other Firms +$0.82 -$0.35 +$0.66 








Other Firms -4.92% +3.56% +1.76% 








Other Firms -0.60% +0.14% +2.03% 
Total Market Shares -1.79% +0.91% +3.54% 








Other Firms na na -8.68% 








Other Firms na -0.14% -1.98% 
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Other Firms +1.53% +1.22% +5.65% 
∆ Components of Welfare 
   
Merging Firms Profits +2.10% +4.68% +6.02% 
Other Firms Profits +1.06% -3.07% +2.60% 
                                   Consumer Welfare.                     -2.85%        +0.94% +3.83%   
 
The results above suggest that a merger between Comcast and Time Warner Cable 
would have resulted in greater efficiencies and benefited consumers. In the absence of  
quality adjustments,  merging firms would have increased their profits at the expense of 
competitors.   However, ignoring quality adjustments can be a serious omission in  the 
merger analysis. Overlooking changes in the compositions of bundles can result  in 
underestimation of total welfare growth. Despite of deterioration in overall quality, decrease 
in prices is enough to offset those adverse changes. This result follows from households’ 
relative preferences for price over quality. The next section discusses changes in bundle 
compositions in more details. 
1.10.3 Changes in the Channel Composition of Bundles 
The advantage of the current approach is that we able to identify the alternative 
compositions of the bundles that will be selected by firms following the deal. We can tell which 
channels will be removed from which bundles and which channels will be added. I keep the 
universe of channels available in each market constant pre- and post-merger. In other words, I 
assume if a channel was not available in the market before the deal (no providers were carrying 
it), it will still by unavailable after the deal. For the most part, top-tier channels are left 
unchanged: A&E, CNN, Discovery,   Disney,   ESPN, FOX News,   USA, etc. are very rarely 
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removed. C-SPAN (Cable-Satellite Public Affairs Network), a private nonprofit network which 
is funded by its cable and satellite affiliates as well as some local governments. C-SPAN is 
considered a useful source of information for journalists, lobbyists, educators and government 
officials as well as casual viewers interested in politics, due to its unedited coverage of political 
events. It is one of the most widely carried (but not so much viewed) channel. However, in 
case of the merger distributors are very likely  to remove C-SPAN in the absence of other 
(“must-carry") regulations. Other channels that are often removed are primarily from the middle 
tier (AMC, Comedy Central, POP, TNT, etc.). Channels that are added most frequently tend to 
have lower quality, but also often appeal to niche groups of views (specialty channels), such 
as Spanish-speakers, combat  sports fans, collegiate sports viewers, jazz music listeners 
(AXS, BTN, De Pelicula, etc.). 
1.11 Conclusion and Further Directions 
Vertically integrated industries are omnipresent and are often characterized by a bilateral 
oligopolistic structure wherein the terms of trade between the upstream and the downstream 
firms are often determined through bargaining. Yet, empirical research investigating 
bargaining outcomes in such settings in somewhat scant. This chapter of my dissertation 
attempts to address this research gap in the empirical context of the U.S. cable industry. 
Specifically, I study how horizontal mergers between cable providers  impacts the vertical 
contracting outcomes (per-subscriber fees that T.V. providers pay the upstream content creators) 
and consequently the prices and composition of bundles that cable providers offer to end 
consumers. The central innovation of this essay is a structural bilateral bargaining model 
between content providers and content creators. My structural modeling approach allows me to 
conduct counterfactual analyses to assess the equilibrium impact of horizontal mergers 
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between cable providers on renegotiated vertical contracts between the merging entities and 
content creators, as well as the new equilibrium vertical contracting terms between other non-
merging competing cable providers and their upstream content creators. The new bilateral 
bargaining outcomes correspondingly impact the prices and cable bundle compositions these 
cable providers offer to their end consumers in a given media market. 
I use my calibrated model to simulate the attempted merger between Comcast and Time 
Warner Cable in 2014. In my baseline counterfactual scenario, consistent with the  general 
public statements/predictions, I find that consumers will face higher prices (2.68 and $0.82 per 
month more for Comcast/TWC bundles and cable bundles from other competing cable 
providers respectively). These higher end-consumer prices at status-quo quality levels result in 
eroding consumer welfare. At the same time, the merging cable providers and their 
competitors realize higher profits albeit accompanied by a reduction in their market shares.  
My analysis suggests, that had this merger application not been withdrawn, and DOJ had 
only focused on price effects of the merger application, they would have correctly denied 
this merger application. However, when I permit re-negotiation of input costs, my 
counterfactual predictions get reversed. Specifically, my analysis reveal the merging entity and it 
competitors would drop the prices for their cable bundles by around -$2.02. The merging 
entity’s profits rise but competing distributors experience a degradation in their profits 
relative to their observed profit levels should the counterfactual merger not be approved. 
Consequently, if the DOJ had also consider the impact of the merger on vertical 
contracting bargaining outcomes, their decision  to approve/deny the application would be 
predicated on how much they weight the increased consumer welfare versus reduced profits 
realized by competing distributors.  Lastly, when I permit firms to renegotiate and adjust their 
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quality provision, my counterfactual analysis reveal that t the Comcast-TWC merger would 
have resulted in deterioration of the quality of cable bundles offered to end-consumers, 
however, the accompanying price reduction following the merger more than offsets the 
adverse effect of tempered quality provisioning. Hence, the merger would have actually 
increased consumer and total welfare. My analysis therefore suggest that had this merger 
application not be withdrawn, the DOJ should have considered approving this merger 
application. I find that this result stems from households being more sensitive to changes in 
price than changes in quality. 
In terms of future directions, a natural next step would be to quantify the effect of a  
horizonal merger between downstream cable providers on the upstream content creators 
advertising revenues. This will complete the current welfare analysis of my horizontal 
merger analysis in this Chapter. My current analysis also does not take into the account  that 
channels owned by conglomerates will make their decisions simultaneously on the behalf of 
all channels they own. Moreover, this model ignores the long-run effects of mergers such as 
the impact on investment in programming quality by channels. In the long run, downstream 
firms can also change the number of products being offered. These long run effects could 
potentially change to prediction of the model and are a salient further research direction. 
Additionally, future research might redefine quality as a mul ti-dimensional measure (instead 
of a scalar) and allow it to reflect qualities of different types of channels included in the 
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CHAPTER 2: QUANTIFYING THE IMPACT OF SERVICE DISRUPTIONS IN THE 
U.S. TELEVISION INDUSTRY 
 
2.1 Introduction 
When T.V. viewers decide to watch television, they are generally choosing among various 
cable and broadcast channels. Cable channels like Animal Planet, ESPN or Comedy Central 
are made available on a national level by cable and satellite T.V. distributors. In  contrast, 
broadcast channels such as CBS, NBC and ABC are distributed locally in each designated 
market area (DMA) via public airwaves. The overwhelming majority of all television 
viewers in the United States access these cable and broadcast channels through their pay T.V. 
distributors/cable providers. 
Television cable providers can generally offer whatever channels they choose and their 
choice of channels varies quite a bit across DMAs. These channels are available to 
T.V. viewers via a menu of cable bundles each with its own composition of channels. As stated 
in chapter 1, cable and satellite providers negotiate vertical-contracting agreements with content 
creators/ TV networks regarding what channels will be carried and on what terms. Distributors 
are required to offer a “basic tier" of programming to all subscribers before they purchase 
additional programming. This basic tier includes, at a minimum, the set of local broadcast 
stations available in the local DMA. Cable providers carry local television broadcast stations 
through “retransmission consent" contracts negotiated with the broadcasters on a market-by-
market basis (United States Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act 
(1992)). Under these contracts, a broadcast station can ask for monetary payment or other 
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compensation, such as the carriage of  an additional channel. These agreements are usually 
extended or renewed before they expire, without any service interruption. However, if the 
contract expires before the negotiating parties agree on terms, the pay TV service distributor 
must stop carrying the local broadcast station’s content until an agreement is reached. During 
the time the negotiations are ongoing the impacted cable providers subscribers are unable to 
access  the impacted broadcast station’s content and a service disruption occurs. 
This essay studies short-term (during the disruption) and long-term (after the disruption is 
over) direct and indirect consequences of these service disruptions for various market players. 
Direct effects refer to the effects on disrupted channels, advertisers and multichannel television 
distributors. Indirect effects refer to effects on competing non- disrupted channels, advertisers 
and distributors operating in the disrupted market. 
In order to quantify the direct- and indirect effect of these service disruptions research 
questions, I will leverage unique institutional features of the U.S. television industry so as  to 
construct a pseudo-natural experiment. I assess the robustness of my treatment effects across 
difference-in-difference, synthetic control, and synthetic difference-in-difference identification 
methods. In each approach I quantify the treatment effect on consumers,  broadcast channels, 
advertisers and pay T.V. distributors. 
I start by quantifying the direct treatment effects in the short-term and long-term. After 
that,  I repeat this exercise for non-disrupted market players.  Upon recovery of all treatment 
effects, I study how the magnitude of these effects is related to the duration of the disruption, 
its severity and whether it spanned multiple markets. I then present a case study, a 
disruption that involved Dish and NBC in two markets, and discuss  its implications for 
all channels and distributors in those two markets. I then present generalized (averaged 
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across all disruptions) direct and indirect treatment effects on all channels and distributors 
and infer households’ substitution patterns from those estimates.  I conclude by studying how 
treatment effects vary across different days of the week and programming types. In order to 
do so, I estimate treatment effects for various time intervals within each day of the week and 
then project these them on the type of programming shown during that  interval. 
2.2 Implications for Market Players 
Recently, the number of blackouts caused by failed negotiations over the terms of 
“retransmission consent" has been continuously increasing, influencing various market players, 
including consumers, broadcast stations, advertisers and pay T.V. distributors. This number 
reached 230 in 2019 and is projected to keep increasing (NL Kagan, The American Television 
Alliance, and Axios (2019)). 
When a service disruption occurs, viewers of an impacted service distributor loose an access 
to a disrupted channel through their cable and satellite packages. Viewers may still access 
that channel by (1) using an over-the-air antenna, (2) subscribing to another  pay T.V. 
distributor that is carrying the station, or (3) checking the internet for broadcast programming. 
Alternatively, viewers can (4) switch to other channels available to them through the same 
T.V. distributor or (5) watch less television in general. 
If viewers choose to continue watching a disrupted channel, but through other means  (1), 
(2) or (3), a channel is unlikely to see changes in its viewership. However, if at least  some 
viewers switch to another channel or watch less television following an event, dis rupted 
channel’s audience is likely to change for the duration of disruption, and perhaps, forever. 
Similarly, competing channels will see an increase in their audience if viewers switch channels 
or a decrease if viewers watch less television. Knowing how customers  will respond to a 
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blackout can impact station’s bargaining power when determining the terms of a retransmission 
contract. For example, if a channel is likely to lose the majority of its subscribers for the 
duration of the blackout, that channel might agree to terms faster in order to minimize the 
adverse effects of the disruption. 
Viewership of a broadcast station impacts its advertising revenue (70% of total revenue, 
Broadcast Industry Overview, SNL Kagan (2016). More specifically, advertisers commit their 
advertising dollars upfront for the following television season, which begins in September, by 
purchasing spots. Spots can vary in length from 15 seconds to 60 seconds or longer. Key factors 
in determining advertising rates are demand by advertisers, network overhead expenses and 
estimates  of station’s viewership by both buyer and seller. In case of a blackout, an ad is 
likely to receive fewer views than expected due to unavailability of a channel to some 
viewers. However, stations rarely give advertisers refunds if an ad is seen by fewer people than 
an advertiser projected. Instead, they offer a makegood commitment - an advertisement run as a 
replacement for one that was scheduled but did not run or that run incorrectly. Hence, a blackout 
can result in advertisers overpaying per eyeball on the disrupted channels and underpaying on 
the competing channels. 
Another party affected by the blackouts is pay T.V. distributors. Service blackouts can 
potentially reduce consumers’ interest in cable or satellite television. Since viewers  can use 
an antenna or Internet or switch to another service distributor in order to restore their access to a 
disrupted channel, a demand for an affected pay T.V. distributor changes. Every subscriber that 





2.3 Research Questions 
In this chapter I study how TV channel disruptions induced by failed negotiations 
between content creators and distributors impact various market players in the short-term and in 
the long-term. I am quantifying effects of the event on both disrupted parties  (impacted channels, 
distributors and advertisers) as well as competing parties (channels, distributors and advertisers 
that are still available to all viewers in the disrupted market). These effects are called direct and 
indirect effects of the disruption respectively. 
First, I look at how disruptions impact viewership of the disrupted channel in the 
short and long run (direct effect). In addition to that, I quantify indirect short and long  term 
effects of the disruption on the competing channels that are still available to all  viewers in 
the treated market. This allows me to study viewers’ substitution patterns. More specifically, 
how many viewers are lost for the impacted channel and whether these viewers switch to other 
available channels or continue watching a disrupted channel through other means. 
Secondly, I address a question of how service disruptions impact advertising revenues of the 
disrupted and non-disrupted channels in the short term. This tells us whether advertisers are 
overpaying or underpaying per viewer reached. 
My last research question studies short run and long run changes in the market shares of the 
disrupted pay T.V. distributors as well as competing distributors in the affected market. This lets 
us know viewers’ substitution patterns across different pay T.V. distributors. Moreover, this lets 
us study whether disruptions decrease overall interest in pay T.V. distributors and make other 
options (such are streaming on demand services) more attractive to consumers.
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2.4 Related Literature 
This paper contributes to several strands of literature. First and foremost, it is related  to 
research on product delistings resulting from failed negotiations. Second, it is linked  to 
studies of consumers’ substitution patterns and demand spillovers. Third, the article studies the 
question in the empirical context of television industry, which has attracted researchers’ attention 
due all the changes it is undergoing. Lastly, it provides a unique application for a recently 
introduced estimator for causal effect - synthetic difference-in-difference. 
The subject of negotiations between independent firms at different levels of distribution in 
vertically contracted industries has been studied from different perspectives. Papers on this topic 
focus on power dynamics between downstream and upstream firms using empirical, game-
theoretic and survey instruments (Ailawadi 2001; Bloom and Perry 2001; Draganska, Klapper, 
and Villas-Boas (2010), Geyskens and Steenkamp 2001). My study gives another perspective on 
the issue of bargaining power by looking at asymmetric consequences of failed negotiations for 
various market players. This allows me to assess which players are the most and the least 
vulnerable to service disruptions in the context of multichannel television industries. 
The closest paper to mine is the one by Van der Maelen et al. (2017) where authors  study 
short and long term implications of conflict delistings. Their study focuses on one  natural 
field experiment concerning a conflict between a major retailer and a manufac turer which 
led to a temporary delisting of manufacturer’s items. I extend this study by  looking at the 
effect of multiple disruptions across different markets and time periods.  I also include 
another party that does not directly take part in negotiation but is also affected by a disruption 
- advertisers. Last but not least, I study indirect (spillover effects) of a channel becoming 
unavailable on competing channels on downstream distributors. 
 
 54 
Conflict delistings are related to other product unavailability situations, such are out-of-
stock (Campo, Gijsbrechts, and Nisol 2000; Sloot and Verhoef 2008), permanent assortment 
reduction (Dukes, Geylani, and Srinivasan (2009); Sloot, Fok, and Verhoef (2006)) and 
brand-delisting (Sloot and Verhoef (2008); Wiebach and Hildebrandt (2012)). However, 
findings from these events are not necessarily transferable to service disruptions or conflict 
delistings. For a further explanation of differences refer to Maelen et al. (2017). 
Literature on consumer substitution is very rich and has studied the implications of  
product and firm switching for consumers and firms. Papers on consumers’ switching 
emphasize the importance of switching costs for consumers’ choices of products and  firms 
(Dube, Hitsch, and Rossi (2009); Klemperer (1987); Rhodes (2014)). The closest study by 
Goettler and Shachar (2001) study spatial competition in television channels  and its 
implications for consumers switching. Shcherbakov (2016) quantifies switching costs 
between T.V. distributors and also explores potential implications for competition. Substitution 
is often studied in the event of introduction of a new product or technology (e.g. Melnikov 
(2013)), while I will be exploring it in the event when one of the products  becomes 
temporarily unavailable in the television industry. 
This industry has been of an interest to researchers itself. Several recent studies focus on the 
impact of regulation on consumer welfare (Crawford (2000)), introduction of alternative 
products (Goolsbee and Petrin (2004), Chu (2010)), monopoly product choices and monopoly 
regulation (Crawford and Shum (2007)), bundling and unbundling (Crawford and Yurukoglu 
(2012), Prince and Greenstein (2014)), and others. My research adds to this stream by studying 
short- and tong-term direct and indirect effects of service disruptions for various players in a 
multichannel television industry. 
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Another relevant stream of research focuses on demand spillovers. Spillover effects  are 
quite well understood in theory (Rochet and Tirole (2003), Armstrong (2006)). In prac tice, 
papers have studied spillover effects from past to current sales (Gentzkow (2007), Dube et 
al. (2010), Haviv et. al.  (2020)) as well as across tied goods (Hartmann and Nair (2010), 
Thomassen et al. (2017)). The focus of this study is the spillovers among competing firms. 
Moreover, spillover effects have been generally studied in response to positive events 
(Balachander and Ghose (2003), Erdem and Sun (2002)), while my paper studies spillover 
effects in a setting when a product becomes unavailable to consumers. Other related studies 
include Ozturk et al. (2019), Freedman et al. (2012), Borah and Tellis (2016). 
Lastly, in my work I exploit several empirical estimators, including traditional difference- 
in-difference, synthetic control and synthetic difference-in-difference. The latter one was 
introduced in the works by Arkhangelsky et al. and extends synthetic control (Abadie and 
Gardeazabal (2003); Abadie et al. (2010, 2015); Doudchenko and Imbens (2016), Gobillon 
and Magnac (2016), Xu (2017)). 
2.5 Data 
My data on service disruptions comes from SNL Kagan and includes 112 events during 
the year of 2016. Distributors and broadcast stations negotiate on a market-by-market basis 
(market defined as a designated market area, or a DMA). In the data set, disruption events caused 
by the failed negotiations affected 69 DMAs. Each of these events involves one of the eight 
broadcast affiliates (NBC, ABC, CBS, FOX, The CW, Univision, UniMas,  MyNetworkTV) and 
one of the four T.V. distributors (Dish, Cox, AT&T, DIRECTTV). These disruptions last 
between one and 250 days with an average of 41 days. These  events affect on average 125,002 
subscribers. Table 2.1 below summarizes the various service disruptions in my data by 
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distributor and channel, with FOX being the most often disrupted channel (MyNetwork is the the 
least often disrupted) and DISH the most often involved distributor (DIRECTV is the least often 
involved). 
Disruptions involving Unimas, NBC and CBS tend to be resolved fast (average du- ration 
of 5, 34 and 38 days), while CW and FOX take the longest time (69 and 59 days). Among 
distributors, AT&T resolved conflicts on average in 6 days, while Dish took 67 days, with other 
distributors falling in between. Table 2.2 provides comparison between 2016 and its 
neighboring years, 2015 and 2017. The year of 2016 had fewer disruptions and in a smaller 
number of markets than in 2015 or 2016, but those events lasted on average longer. 
Table 2.1: Number of Disruptions During 2016 
 
 DISH Cox AT&T DIRECTV  
NBC 9 4 - 2 15 
ABC 4 2 - 7 13 
CBS 12 3 - 2 17 
FOX 16 4 1 2 23 
The CW 12 2 - 1 15 
Univision - - 13 - 13 
Unimas - - 11 - 11 
MyNetworkTV 3 1 1 - 5 
 57 16 26 13 112 
 
Additionally, I use data on the number of subscribers to multichannel television 
distributors. This data is recorded quarterly for 12 distributors: AT&T, Bright House, Cable 
One, Cablevision, Charter, Time Warner Cable, Verizon, WideOpenWest, Comcast, Cox, 
DIRECTV, Dish. It is available for 2544 counties within 205 DMAs. 
I supplement this data with the data from Nielsen Ad Intel. Nielsen Ad Intel provides 
information on advertising occurrences, views and spending by advertisers. Advertising 
occurrences (instances of showing an ad), corresponding views and dollar amounts spend  on 
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the advertisements are recorded for each broadcasting station (959), by date (365), day of the 
week (7), time interval (130), part of the day (8), program type (41) and program (17118). 
I assume that the number of households exposed to an ad on the channel is a good 
approximation for the number of households watching that channel. For a more detailed 
information on how impressions are recorded, please refer to Appendix. 
Table 2.2: Key Comparison Statistics for Disruptions in 2015, 2016, and 2017 
 
 2015 2016 2017 
# Events 240 112 266 
# Events: >6 Days 38 60 144 
# Unique Distributors 5 4 13 
# Unique Stations 7 8 8 
# Unique Markets 140 69 104 
Average Duration (days) 7.90 41.17 26.38 
 
 
2.6  Dependent Variables 
I examine the direct and indirect effect of the aforementioned service disruptions on 
multiple dependent variables. I discuss each of these below and describe how each of these are 
operationalized/ measured in the empirical analyses that follows. 
2.6.1 Viewership 
Gross Rating Point (GRP) is the most widely used metric to measuring the reach of an 
ad. GRP measures the size of an audience (or total amount of exposures) reached by  a 
specific media vehicle during a specific period of time. It is measured by a ratio of the 
estimated number of viewers (impressions) to the total number of households in the television 
universe, expressed as a percentage. 
𝐺𝑅𝑃 =
(Sum of Unique Persons or Households Exposed)
(Sum of Persons or Households in the Sample)




2.6.2 Advertising spending 
Advertising dollars on national networks are usually committed upfront in the spring for the 
following season which starts in fall. This upfront buy insures an advertiser against sellout but 
has little flexibility with regard to cancellations (usually possible with 90-days notice). Other 
less prevalent ways to purchase national advertising are scatter and opportunistic.   These 
ways has historically been less efficient and are contingent on a network having inventories. 
Regional spot advertising is generally purchased two months prior to the start of the 
programming schedule. Most local broadcasting stations require a four weeks cancelation 
notice (Jack Sissors and Lincoln Bumba (1993)). 
Stations and Networks rarely give advertisers refunds. Instead, they offer a makegood 
commitment - an advertisement run as a replacement for one that was scheduled but did not run, 
or that ran incorrectly due to the fault of station or network. 
Key factors in determining advertising rates are demand by advertisers, estimates by both 
buyer and seller of audience delivery, and network overhead expenses. 
In order to measure advertisers’ spend on the ad, we can use cost per point (CPP),  cost 
per thousand (CPM) or absolute amount of dollars spend. CPP measures how much 
advertisers paid per a percent of households reached, while CMP measures how much 
advertisers paid per impression delivered. In this paper, I use CPP, though conclusions  are 
identical if CPM is used instead. Additionally, I explore Spend, an absolute measure 












2.6.3 Subscribers to Multichannel Distributor 
In order to address household choices of multichannel television distributors, I use mar ket 
shares of distributors. 
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 =
Number of Households Subscribed in the Market
Total Number of Households in the Market
 
More details on these measure can be found in Appendix. 
2.7 Identification Strategy 
In order to credibly and causally estimate treatment effects, I will be conducting pseudo- 
experiments. I will leverage the naturally occurring variation in my observational data  and 
combine it with institutional features of my empirical context to generate appropriate 
counterfactual units for each of my treatment events. Herein, a treated market is the market, 
where a disruption happens and a control market is the market with no disruptions.  So as to 
generate close to ideal experimental variation, I will address the following threats to 
identification. 
2.7.1 Treats to Identification 
1. Disruptions in Control Markets 
I remove a market from a set of controls if it was experiencing any disruptions during either 
pre- or post-treatment period. 
2. Measurement Error in Outcome Variable Number of views for an advertisement is 
recorded using a Live+7 (L7) method: on the same day it aired with seven days of DVR and on-
demand viewing added. The majority of delayed viewing that Nielsen measures happens in this 
timeframe, with most shows growing their audiences by a good amount. In advertising circles, 
the Live+7 period is becoming increasingly relevant as viewers watch content on a variety of 
devices at different times. However, this presents a challenge for identification of the 
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treatment effects for the events that are shorter than seven days, since the outcome (GRP) in 
post-treatment time  will include some of the views from pre-treatment periods. To allay this 
concern, I remove events shorter than seven days from the analysis. 
3.   Multiple Simultaneous Disruptions in the Same Market 
 Another identification challenge arises in the markets, where several channels are disrupted 
at the same time. In such a case, we cannot guarantee a clean treatment effect on the treated, 
since the treated unit might be receiving spillover demand  from another channel’s blackout. 
On average, there is one disruption per market at  a time, however in some market as many as 
3 channels are unavailable concurrently. I remove all events that coincide with other concurrent 
disruptions in the same  market. 
4. Disruptions are Not Always Independent 
Broadcast stations are operated by parent broadcasting companies (Sunbeam Television, 
USA Television, Tribune Media, etc.). Often these companies own stations in  multiple 
markets. In these cases, broadcast companies negotiate with multichannel television distributors 
on behalf of all stations in all markets they operate in. When  these negotiations fail, more 
than one market can be subject to a disruption. Thus,  some disruptions are not independent. I 
will allow for these events to be correlated and simultaneously estimate a treatment effect. 
5. Differences in Treatment Effect Across Various Programs 
There is a concern that a disruption might have different effects on various types  of 
programs within a day (news, daytime drama, sport events, etc.).  Estimating one treatment 
effect for all programming would potentially result in an incorrect estimate. Thus, I will 




6. Differences in Market Sizes 
In order to address the issue of a scaling effect caused by absolute differences in  market 
sizes, I will use a natural logarithmic transformation of dependent variables. 
7. Duration of Pre-Treatment Period 
I choose duration of pre-treatment period equal to the duration of the disruption. This 
allows disruptions that last longer to be compared to a longer period of time. 
2.8 Treatment Effects Designs 
I am evaluating the effects of a disruption using panel data in a setting where some units  
are exposed to the treatment in some periods while others are not.  Consider a panel with N 
units (channels) and T time periods (time intervals with scheduled commercial breaks within 
a day). The outcome (viewership/ advertising spend/ market share) for a unit i in a period t is 
denoted by Yit and the exposure to treatment (service disruption) is denoted by Wit = {0, 1}.   
First Ncon have not been exposed to treatment and will be used as controls, while other units  
Ntre = N − Ncon have been treated after period Tpre = T − Tpost. 
Realized outcome:  
𝑌 = (
𝑌11 𝑌12 ⋯ 𝑌1𝑇
𝑌21 𝑌22 ⋯ 𝑌2𝑇
⋮ ⋮ ⋱ ⋮







0 0 ⋯ 0 0
0 0 ⋱ 0 0
⋮ ⋮ ⋱ ⋮ ⋮
0 0 ⋯ 1 1




In these matrices above, first Ncon rows represent control units and Ntre rows represent 
treatment units. Similarly, first Tpre are related to pre-treatment periods, while Tpost are related to 
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post-treatment periods. The inputs in W matrix that related to treated units 
Ntre during post-treated time periods Tpost equal to 1,  otherwise 0.  This set-up allows 
for multiple units to be treated at the same time (as shown by two last rows of the 
treatment matrix). I use this setup for difference-in-difference, synthetic control and 
synthetic difference-in-difference estimation methods. 
2.9 Difference-in-Difference 
One of the most widely used statistical techniques that attempts to mimic an experimental 
research design using observational study data is difference-in-difference (Ashenfelter and 
Card (1984), Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004), and Angrist and Pischke (2008)). 
Difference-in-difference (DiD) is a feasible quasi-experimental technique which assumes that 
we can adequately control for selection effects by accounting for additive unit-specific and 
time-specific fixed effects. 
In the setting of broadcaster’s service disruption, we are worried that treated markets, where 
channel gets disrupted, are selected non-randomly. Also, content creators and  distributors 
might fail to renew their contracts by the deadline more often in smaller markets than in 
bigger markets where the loss from the resulting blackout is significantly higher for both parties. 
Moreover, assignment across periods might also be non-random: firms tend to renew their 
contracts during a certain time of the year, when the adverse effects of possible disruptions 
will be minimized. Difference-in-difference avoids these two threats by differencing away any 
permanent differences between the groups and any common trend affecting both groups. 
DiD estimates the treatment effect by solving two-way fixed effects regression, where  αi is 
equivalent to a unit fixed effect, βt is equivalent to a time fixed effect and τ measures treatment 
effect on the treated units: 
 
63  
(?̂?𝑑𝑖𝑑 , 𝜇 ̂, ?̂? ) = argmin
𝜏,𝜇,𝛼,𝛽







2.10 Synthetic Control 
Difference-in-difference method has certain limitations. First of all, it requires 
parallel trends assumption, meaning that we can control for selection effects by accounting 
for additive unit-specific and time-specific fixed effects. Secondly, it assigns equal weights to 
all control markets. Thirdly, it does not provide guidance on which markets should be 
included in the control set. More recently, Abadie and co-authors introduced a synthetic 
control method that does not require parallel trends and compensate for the lack of latter by re-
weighting units to match their pre-treatment trends. These weights can be zero, meaning that 
not all controls are relevant and will be excluded from estimation (Abadie and Gardeazabal 
(2003), Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller (2010, 2015)). 
These weights ω̂ sc  are  designed  so  that  the  average  outcomes  for  the  treated  unit  
(N) are approximately parallel to the averages for control units (1, .., N − 1) for all pre-









Since synthetic control method determines which control markets should be included and 
their weights, no subjective judgement on that part is required. 












We then predict outcome for a treated unit in post-treatment period: 




And find the treatment effect: 
?̂? = 𝑌𝑁𝑇 − ?̂?𝑁𝑇(0) 
SC estimates the treatment effect by solving the following regression: 
(?̂?𝑠𝑐, 𝜇 ̂, ?̂? ) = argmin
𝜏,𝜇,𝛽








Synthetic control assumes there is a relation between outcomes in treated period and pre-
treatment periods that is the same for all units. 
2.11 Synthetic Difference-in-Difference 
Synthetic Difference-in-Difference combines the advantages of both DiD and SC. Similar 
to SC, it re-weights and matches pre-exposure trends to weaken the reliance on the parallel 
trend assumption. Additionally, similar to unit weights SDiD assigns weights to  different 
time periods. Inclusion of time weights improves precision by eliminating the role of time 
periods that are different from post-treatment periods. 
Herein,  We  find  weights  ω̂ sdid  that  match  trends  in  pre-treatment  period  in  the  
outcomes of control units with those of treatment units for all t = 1, .., Tpre: 






(?̂?𝑠𝑑𝑖𝑑 , 𝜇 ̂, ?̂?, ?̂? ) = argmin
𝜏,𝜇,𝛼,𝛽









Figure 2.1 compares different estimation strategies in terms of weights used, while Figure 2.2 
illustrates how the treatment effect is calculated for SDiD, SC and DiD. 
Figure 2.1: Choice of weights across DiD, SC and SDiD Methods 
 
 




2.12 Estimation Sample and Results 
In this section I apply three causal inference approaches outlined before to estimate changes 
in viewership, advertising revenues and market shares of distributors resulting from a service 
disruption. 
Out of 112 events that happened during 2016, 60 lasted seven days or longer. After 
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removing events that coincided with other disruptions in the same market, we are left  with 
39 events. I further remove events that either started in 2015 or ended in 2017 (total of  6 events). 
This gives me 29 independent events. I assume that events are not independent (related to each 
other) if they involve same distributor, same channel and same parent company. The final 
estimation sample consist of 10 unique events, some of which involve  multiple related 
disruptions. Table 2.3. provides information on these events. 
Table 2.3: Estimation Sample 
Distributor Affiliate Parent Market Subs. impacted Start Date End 
Date 
Duration ID 
DIRECTV ABC USA 
Television 
Eugene, OR 50,523 8/11/16 9/17/16 37 1 
DIRECTV ABC USA 
Television 
Medford, OR 43,434 8/11/16 9/17/16 37 1 
DIRECTV CBS USA 
Television 
Chico, CA 42,327 8/11/16 9/17/16 37 2 
DIRECTV NBC USA 
Television 
Columbus, MS 50,902 8/11/16 9/17/16 37 3 
DIRECTV ABC Forum Fargo, ND 57,138 6/2/16 8/19/16 78 4 
DIRECTV ABC Forum Minot, ND 33,241 6/2/16 8/19/16 78 4 
DISH ABC Tribune Wilkes Barre, PA 67,416 6/12/16 9/3/16 83 5 
DISH ABC Tribune Davenport, IA 40,158 6/12/16 9/3/16 83 5 
DISH CBS Tribune Memphis, TN 85,721 6/12/16 9/3/16 83 6 
DISH CBS Tribune Richmond, VA 52,042 6/12/16 9/3/16 83 6 
DISH CBS Tribune Huntsville, AL 46,825 6/12/16 9/3/16 83 6 
DISH FOX Tribune Cleveland, OH 133,753 6/12/16 9/3/16 83 7 
DISH FOX Tribune Sacramento, CA 170,609 6/12/16 9/3/16 83 7 
DISH FOX Tribune San Diego, CA 94,183 6/12/16 9/3/16 83 7 
DISH FOX Tribune Kansas City, 
MO 
97,653 6/12/16 9/3/16 83 7 
DISH FOX Tribune Milwaukee, WI 89,022 6/12/16 9/3/16 83 7 
DISH FOX Tribune Salt Lake City, 
UT 
151,870 6/12/16 9/3/16 83 7 
DISH FOX Tribune Harrisburg, PA 58,575 6/12/16 9/3/16 83 7 
DISH FOX Tribune Grand Rapids, 
MI 
82,187 6/12/16 9/3/16 83 7 
DISH FOX Tribune Greensboro, NC 77,644 6/12/16 9/3/16 83 7 
DISH MyNetworkT
V 
Tribune Philadelphia, PA 136,100 6/12/16 9/3/16 83 8 
DISH NBC Tribune Oklahoma, OK 92,452 6/12/16 9/3/16 83 9 
DISH NBC Tribune Des Moines, IA 67,515 6/12/16 9/3/16 83 9 
DISH The CW Tribune New York, NY 356,698 6/12/16 9/3/16 83 10 
DISH The CW Tribune Los Angeles, 
CA 
646,446 6/12/16 9/3/16 83 10 
DISH The CW Tribune Washington, DC 124,983 6/12/16 9/3/16 83 10 
DISH The CW Tribune Dallas, TX 329,117 6/12/16 9/3/16 83 10 
DISH The CW Tribune Houston, TX 279,200 6/12/16 9/3/16 83 10 





2.12.1 Direct Short-Term Effects 
I will start by discussing how service disruption impacts disrupted channel’s viewership, 
spendings by advertisers that place their ads on the disrupted channel as well as market  
shares of disrupted pay T.V. distributors. I define short term as period while the disruption is 
in place and a channel is unavailable to some viewers through their cable and satellite 
packages. Table 2.4 presents treatment effects on GRP, Spend, CPP and Quantity of the ads 
placed within a day estimated using difference-in-difference, synthetic control and synthetic 
difference in difference. 
I find significant negative treatment effects on channel’s viewership for 4 out of 10 events in 
my sample (# 4, 6, 7, and 9). This result is generally consistent across three estimation strategies. 
However, SDiD also picked up an event (# 6) that is not significant when using either DiD or 
SC. This shows us that often during disruptions viewers do not search for alternative ways to 
watch disrupted channel’s programming. Consequently, in the short-term that channel loses 
some of its viewers. The magnitude of these effects varies across events with some treatment 
coefficients (-0.077 for #6) being twice as high as others (-0.154 for # 9). 
I find that during some of the disruptions that resulted in a lower viewership, advertisers paid 
significantly less per spot (# 6, 7). However, other disruptions that created an even greater loss in 
the eyeballs (# 4, 9) did not lead to lower spendings for a spot. Advertisers  that pay for the 
spots upfront are unlikely to anticipate a disruption and ask for a lower  rate during the event. 
Thus, the fact that in some cases we get a negative treatment effect on prices is likely be 
caused by channels selling last-minute spots inventory during the disruption at a highly 
discounted price. 
Consequently, during some events that resulted in lower viewership (# 6, 7) advertisers did 
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not overpay for the points delivered (impressions made) due to lower spending per spot. For 
other events (# 9, 5) where advertisers were not able to adjust prices for lower viewership, I 
find a significant positive treatment effect on CPP, meaning that advertisers overpaid per 
impressions delivered. 
Another question that arises is whether disrupted channels create more advertising spots to 
compensate for the partial loss in advertising revenues. I find only one such  occasion 
where more advertising spots were created (#9) meaning that in general number of slots 
available remains the same for the duration of the disruption. 
As for disrupted pay T.V. distributors, I find that their market shares drop in the short- term 
(# 2, 3, 5). These results are summarized in left panel of Table 2.5. Additionally, DiD and 
SC pick up cases that led to significantly lower distributor’s market shares that   were 
insignificant using SDiD (# 7, 8, 9, 10). In short-term most of the cable and satellite 
subscribers are bound by contractual obligations and have to pay a penalty if they want to 
cancel their subscription. Nevertheless, a negative treatment effects means that some of the 
subscribers either did not renew their contracts that expired during the disruptions or terminated 
their existing contracts. 
2.12.2 Direct Long-Term Effects 
In this section I address how much of the short-term results persist even after the disruption is 
over and the channel becomes available again through all cable and satellite distributors. I 
define long-term as a period right after the disruption is over, equal in length to the 
corresponding disruption. Table 2.6 summarizes direct long-term treatment effects on channels 
and advertisers for all events in the sample. 















significant treatment effect on GRPs (# 9). In that case, even when the disruption is   over, a 
previously disrupted channel continues to lose its audience. In the long-term, I  do not find 
significant changes in advertising spendings per spot or per impression made  caused by a 
disruption. I do not find changes in the number of spots made available for  advertisers after 
the event either. Hence, for channels and advertisers the effects of these  disruptions are short 
lived and in most cases are eliminated once the channel is back. 
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On the contrary, there are significant long-term implications for pay T.V. distributors  as 
shown by the right panel of Table 2.5. Majority of distributors that saw a decrease in  their 
market shares in short run continue to loose subscribers in the long run. Moreover, as reflected 
by the magnitude of coefficients, long-term treatment effects are often as large or even larger 
than short-term effects. This is consistent with the fact that in the long- term dissatisfied 
subscribers are less contractually bound and have more flexibility in switching distributors. 
2.12.3 Determinants of Direct Treatment Effects 
In this section I study how direct treatment effects vary across events in the sample. Table 
2.7. presents results for the short-term. I find a cumulative time effect of the disruption:  the 
longer it lasts, the more audience will be lost by channels and distributors in total.  
Moreover, advertisers will overpay more per impression delivered during longer lasting 
disruptions. I also find that in short-term disruptions that impact multiple markets result  in 
greater loss in viewership in each market while advertisers overpay less.   This can  be 
explained by the size effect: disruptions that impact more than one market involve 
broadcasting companies that operate in more than one market. These broadcasting companies 
tend to be bigger and better at managing their advertising revenues and, hence,  giving 
advertisers more favorable terms. I do not find any impact of the severity of  the 
disruption on treatment coefficients, where severity is measures as the number of 
subscribers impacted in the market. 
After the disruption is over, events that lasted longer also result in more eyeballs and pay 
T.V. subscribers being lost. This is rather straightforward: the longer viewers do  not have an 
access to a channel, the more likely they are to stick to an alternative channel and distributor 
they have chosen instead. For advertisers, I do not find a significance of the event’s duration 
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but I do find that for the longer lived durations channels are more likely to create extra 
advertising spots in the long-term. I also find that viewers punish disruptions that span 
multiple markets by switching to other channels more, even in the long-term. 
Table 2.7: Determinants of Direct Short-Term Treatment Effects 
 Short Term 





-0.001*** 0.004*** 0.007*** 0.000 -0.001*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (3.56e-06 ) 
Severity 
-1.20e-09 9.11e-10 1.89e-09 -3.17e-09 -2.57e-11 
(1.91e-08) (1.45e-08) (3.00e-08) (5.04e-08) (4.09e-10 ) 
Multiple 
-0.045*** -0.322*** -0.332*** -0.044 0.019*** 
(0.010) (0..007) (0.016) (0.027) (0.000) 
Channel FE yes yes yes yes yes 
 
Table 2.8: Determinants of Direct Long-Term Treatment Effects 
 Long Term 
 GRP SPEND CPP QUANTITY    MARKET    
SHARE 
Duration 
-0.002*** -0.001 0.003** 0.001*** -0.001*** 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Severity 
9.71e-10 -4.15e-09 -9.67e-09 -1.18e-09 1.80e-10 
(1.54e-08) (6.61e-08) (1.54e-07) (1.87e-08) (2.87e-09) 
Multiple 
-0.045*** -0.002 -0.201** -0.065*** 0.022*** 
(0.008) (0.036) (0.083) (0.010) (0.001) 
Channel FE yes yes yes yes yes 
 
2.12.4 Indirect Short-Term Effects 
Table 2.9 presents results from estimation of short-term indirect (spillover) effects on 
competing channels and advertisers placing their ads on those competing channels. In  this 
case, a treated unit would be any other channel (apart from a disrupted) in the impacted market. 
A set of controls consists of all channels not affiliated with the disrupted one in all other markets. 
This approach lets us study how television market is impacted in general, whether consumers 
watch television less and advertisers pay more irrespectively of a channel identity.  










The disadvantage of this "pooled" approach is that a control for a particular channel in a 
treated market, for instance NBC, chosen by SDiD, might be a totally different channel, for 
example ABC. This will be relaxed later in the following sections where I calculate spillover 














treatment effects on the competing channels on a channel-by-channel basis. 
I find that households watch more programming on competing channels following  a 
service disruption,  but this effect is often insignificant.   However,  this small change is 
enough to let advertisers benefit from free audience and significantly underpay for  
impressions delivered (# 5, 8, 9). I also find that in two cases competing channels created  
more advertising slots (# 3, 7) to attract last-minute advertisers that opted out of disrupted 
                Short Term               Long Term 










































































































-0.038*** -0.085*** -0.077*** 
(0.012) (0.016) (0.013) 
-0.073** -0.145*** -0.142*** 


















Table 2.10 (left panel) summarizes long-term results for competing pay T.V. distributors. 
Using the same approach as above, I do not differentiate between distributors’ identities. I 
find significantly negative effect of market shares of non-disrupted providers. This might 
suggest that disruptions spur households in general to cancel their cable and satellite 
packages. If that is the case, then disruptions speed up cord-cutting, a process of switching 
away from traditional television to alternative options, such as on-demand streaming 
platforms. However, this result might be caused by the selection of controls  which will be 
revisited in the following sections. 
2.12.5 Indirect Long-Term Effects 
Right panel of Table 2.10 and Table 2.11 summaries long-term treatment effects for 
competing market players. I find that after the disruption is over, viewers begin to watch more of 
the competing channels’ programming in tree cases (# 2, 8, 10) and less in one case (# 6). The 
former result is likely to be caused by households trying out new channels during  the 
disruption and continuing to watch them after; the latter can be due to households cancelling 
their traditional television packages. As a result, events that led to an increase  in the 
viewership in the long-term also benefited advertisers (negative treatment effect on CPP) and 
vice versa. Similar to the short-term, competing distributors continued to see a decrease in their 
market shares after the disruption was over. 
2.12.6 Determinants of Indirect Treatment Effects 
In the short-term (Table 2.12), indirect effects of the disruption depend significantly on 
its duration. The longer it lasts, the higher is the increase in viewership for competing 
channels. On the other hand, the results suggest that during longer disruptions  
 








Table 2.12: Determinants of Indirect Short-Term Treatment Effect 
 
 Short Term 



































Channel FE yes yes yes yes yes 
 
Table 2.13: Determinants of Indirect Long-Term Treatment Effect 
 
 Long Term 
 GRP Spend CPP Quantity Share 
Duration 
0.000 -0.003*** -0.002*** 0.006*** 0.002 















-0.101* -0.027 -0.073 -0.577*** -0.337*** 
(0.053) (0.054) (0.047) (0.097) (0.083) 
Channel yes yes yes yes yes 
 
competing distributors get fewer new subscribers (or lose more of existing subscribers), 
which is consistent with a hypothesis that service disruptions stimulate cord-cutting behavior. 
In short run, the length of the disruption is positively associated with the amount of  
advertising spots created by competing channels and negatively related to the price  per ad 
paid by advertisers. Hence, during longer disruptions advertisers have a larger quantity of 
spots on competing channels and underpay more for those spots and impres sions delivered. 
These effects of the disruption’s duration on Spend, CPP and Quantity of the spots 
persist even after the disruption, though their magnitudes are smaller in the long-term. I do not 
find significance of the duration for indirect treatment effects on channels’ vierewship or the 
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number of subscribers to competing distributors in the long-term. 
2.13 Application: NBC vs. DISH 
In this section, I illustrate my analysis using am example of a particular disruption. I chose 
this event because its consequences were rather long lasting for both disrupted  market 
players as well as their competitors. In 2016 in Oklahoma City, OK and Des Moines, IA Dish 
and NBC failed to reach an agreement before their existing contract expired which caused a 
blackout that lasted for 83 days from 6/12/16 to 9/3/16. This event affected more than 97,600 
households in Oklahoma and 67,000 in Des Moines. 
Figure 2.3 shows how the respective control units are weighted for difference-in-difference 
(left panel), synthetic control (middle panel) and synthetic difference-in-difference (right panel) 
specifications when I estimate the impact of this service disruption on disrupted channel’s GRPs. 
The size of the dots represent respective weights and horizontal lines show 95% confidence 
interval for the treatment effect. In case of difference-in-difference all control units are 
weighted equally: we use 105/105 control markets and 83/83 periods. Synthetic control picked 
56/105 markets and all time periods. Synthetic difference-in-difference assigned positive 
weights to 69/105 units and 8/83 periods. The location of the dots on the y-axis represents 
individual treatment effect (compared to that unit). Depending on which control units are 
available and the weights assigned, we can get  different estimates. The key takeaway here is 
that composition of control units matter, but control units do not contribute equally.   
Figure 2.4 depicts time series of an outcome variable (GRP) for our treated (green) and 
control (red) units. The estimated treatment effect is illustrated with a black arrow, where its 
direction (pointing down) and size represent the sign (negative) and size of a treatment effect. It 
is easy to see from this figure that both DiD and SDiD take differences twice: first, between 
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average pre- (dots on the left) and post- (dots on the right) disruption outcomes for treated and 
control units and then between those differences. SC, on the other hand, only calculates the 
difference in post-disruption dependent variable between a treated and a control unit. 
The benefit of estimating treatment effects on a case-by-case basis is that it allows us to 
study substitution patterns between disrupted and competing channels as well as between 
disrupted and competing distributors. Table 2.14 presents own and spillover effects on channels’ 
viewership and advertising spend resulting from a Dish-NBC disruption. In the short run, NBC 
lost some of its audience which lead to advertisers overpaying per impression delivered on 
NBC. Some of these viewers switched to FOX (positive treatment effect on its GRPs) while  
 
Figure 2.3: Comparison of Control Unit and Their Weights Across DiD, SC and SDiD 
Methods - NBC’s Viewership
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Figure 2.4: Comparison of DiD, SC and SDiD Methods - NBC’s viewership 
 
 
while other competing channels did not see any significant changes in their audience 
measures.  This increase in viewership for FOX was more than temporal and continued even 
after the disruption. The results also suggest that advertisers overpaid per impression 
delivered on NBC and underpaid on ABC, CBS and CW (even though they did not get a 
significant increase in the viewership). 
As for pay T.V. distributors, I find a negative direct treatment effect on Dish and a 
positive spillover effect on DIRECTV. DIRECTV was the closest competitor in the 
disrupted markets (both distributors use satellite technology) with similar markets shares. 
AT&T and Mediacom were present only in certain parts of the disrupted markets and had 






























































Table 2.15: Substitution Between Distributors: Dish-NBC 
Disruption 
 




















2.13.1 Substitution Between Channels and Distributors 
The above mentioned substitution patterns are true for Oklahoma and Des Moines in 2016. 
However, as shown previously, treatment and substitution effects greatly vary across markets. 
Table 2.16 summarizes average treatment effects on channels’ viewership with diagonal 
elements representing own effects and off-diagonal elements representing spillover effects. 
Columns contain channels that are being disrupted. Direct effects are always negative and 
generally larger in magnitudes than indirect effects. The largest direct effect is for FOX (-0.094), 
while CBS (-0.043) has the smallest direct effect. Indirect effects have mixed signs: while some 
competing channels benefit from positive spillover effects, other lose their viewership due to 
households watching less television. For instance, upon  a disruption of ABC, FOX receives 
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extra eyeballs (0.133) while NBC loses its audience (-0.017). The magnitude of the coefficients 
also reflect the likelihood of viewers to pick an alternative channel. For instance, when CBS is 
disrupted, NBC benefits more in terms of extra viewers (0.012) than FOX (0.006). Interestingly, 
I find that when FOX gets disrupted, the viewership for all other competing channels drops. 
Possibly, FOX’s viewers do not consider other channels an alternative and per disruptions, prefer 
to switch away from traditional television to other sources for news and entertainment. 
Table 2.17 summarizes own and spillover treatment effects on distributor’s market shares in 
the long run. I estimate indirect treatment effects only for pairs of distributors that meet in the 
same markets in my sample (for instance, DIRECTV and Verizon do not operate in the 
same markets). In addition to negative direct effects I find mostly  positive indirect effects 
suggesting that households substitute a disrupted distributor with another. Upon a disruption of 
DIRECTV households are more likely to switch to  Comcast wherever it is available. Similarly, a 
disruption of DISH benefits Charter the most. These two distributors tend to have the highest 
market shares in the markets where they operate. However, I also obtain negative average 
treatment effects for AT&T, WOW and Cable Onle, whose subscribers are likely to cancel their 
subscriptions due to a disruption that did not directly affect them. 
Table 2.16: Substitution Between Channels 
 
 NBC FOX CBS CW ABC MN 
NBC -0.087 -0.001 0.012 0.112 -0.017 0.111 
FOX 0.051 -0.094 0.006 -0.085 0.133 -0.034 
CBS -0.003 -0.029 -0.043 -0.019 0.000 0.047 
CW 0.156 -0.137 0.065 -0.052 -0.028 -0.151 
ABC 0.013 -0.034 0.015 0.001 -0.069 0.058 
















2.14 Treatment Effects Across Different Days of the Week  and Program 
When constructing control units using SDiD, we selectively pick time periods that closely 
match pre-treatment outcomes for treated units. In fact, channel’s viewership and advertising 
spending highly vary across different days of the week. As shown by Figure 2.5 (left panel), 
Sunday gets the most views, Saturday gets the least views, while viewing from Monday till 
Friday exhibits a u-shape with the lowest point on Wednesday. Similarly, advertising spots 
on Sunday cost advertisers the most (middle panel) and on Wednesday the least. Even though 
viewership on Saturday is the lowest, advertisers value these eyeballs and are willing to 
pay more per impression than during any other day of the week. 
 







DISH 0.004 -0.006 
Comcast 0.019 0.011 
Charter 0.008 0.021 
Cable One -0.031 0.047 
ATT -0.008 -0.005 
Verizon - 0.082 
WOW - -0.003 
Cablevision - 0.006 
Mediacom - 0.017 
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Viewership and advertising spend also vary by the type of programming, as depicted  by 
Figure 2.6. Award ceremonies, comedy, drama and news are the most watched programs, 
while instructions and advice are the least. Advertisers are willing to pay more for spots 
during these programs, leading to higher cost per impression. On the other hand, cost of 
advertising during documentaries and local sport events is much lower. 
These institutional details bring a concern that treatment effects of disruptions vary  by 
days of the week and programming type. Some programs and days of the week might see 
larger decrease in GRPs and increase in CPPs than others. Knowing how these effects differ can 
potentially help channels optimize their programming to minimize loss in viewership and 
advertisers to maximize return on their advertising dollars spent. To allay this concern, I am 
now estimating treatment effects for a small time interval within a certain day of the week.  
 




There are 825 such day-time intervals. Control units for a day-time interval are the same day-
time intervals a week before, two-week before, three weeks before, etc. Finding appropriate 
controls in my case is possible, since I limit the set of disruptions to ones that last for at 
least a week. For each such interval, I estimate treatment effects for GRP, Spend and CPP, 
with a total of 4169 treatment effects for each of the dependent variables. I then map these 
treatment effects on the disruption fixed effect, day of the week, and type of the program that 
was shown during that interval. 
Table 1.18 shows results of regressions of dependent variables (treatment effects) on the 
disruption ids, days of the week and programming type. First, treatment effects differ by the 
disruptions. Moreover, I find that out of all days of the week, Saturday treatment effects are 
significantly different. On Saturdays, loss in GRPs tend to be smaller and advertisers tend to 
overpay less. This means that "Saturday audience" is more loyal and is likely to watch 
Saturday content through other means rather than switch to another channel.  Across all 
types of programming, select shows saw a larger decrease in viewership: news, daytime 
drama, sport events, situation comedy, feature film, comedy variety and child news. 
Relationship between programming types and treatment effects on advertisers is not trivial. 
While advertisers overpaid during most of the programming  types mentioned, they also 
overpaid and underpaid during others. 
2.15 Summary and Directions for Future Research 
Pay T.V. distributors are required to obtain a permission from broadcasters (ABC, NBC,  
FOX, etc.) before they carry their programming. Broadcasters usually ask cable and satellite 
operators for monetary and non-monetary (for instance, carriage of an additional channel) 
compensation in exchange for their programming. These compensations, are determined as a  
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Table 2.18: Treatment Effects by Days of the Week and Programming Types 
 
 GRP Spend CPP 
2 
-0.002 0.001 -0.002 












































































































































































































































































-0.004 0.077 0.077** 





result of bilateral negotiations between broadcasters and distributors.  Contracts are usually 
renewed yearly, without service interruptions. However, if current contracts expire and parties 
cannot reach an agreement, a distributor must stop carrying the channel until the dispute is 
resolved and a service disruption occurs. 
In this chapter I study how TV channel disruptions induced by failed negotiations between 
content creators and distributors impact channels’ viewership, advertisers’ expenditures and 
distributor’s market shares in the short-term and long-term.   I focus on both direct and indirect 
effects of the disruption. Direct effects refer to the effects on disrupted market players, while 
indirect effects refer to effects on competing players operating in the disrupted market. I define 
a short-term as a period when a channel is not available to some households through a 
disrupted distributor and a long-term as a period following right after the channel comes back. 
In order to do so, I leverage institutional features of the U.S. television industry to  
construct a pseudo-natural experiment and propose several identification frameworks to quantify 
the treatment effect. I present the results using difference-in-difference, synthetic control, and 
synthetic difference-in-difference methods and discuss what the obtained estimates mean for 
various market players. I start by quantifying the direct treatment effects on channel’s 
viewership (GRP), dollar amount spend per advertising spot (Spend), advertisers’ costs per 
impression delivered (CPP), number of advertising slots available within a day (Quantity) and 
market shares of disrupted distributors. I then recover direct treatment effects in the long run. 
After that, I repeat this exercise for competing channels, advertisers placing their ads on those 
channels and non-disrupted pay T.V. distributors. 
Upon recovery of direct and indirect treatment effects in short-term and long-term I study 
how the magnitude of these effects is related to the duration of the disruption, its severity and 
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whether it spanned multiple markets. 
I then present a case study, a disruption that involved Dish and NBC in two markets. Using 
this example I illustrate SDiD, DiD, and SC estimation procedures and discuss how  to use 
those estimates to infer direct and indirect effects on all channels and distributors in those two 
markets. I then present generalized (averaged across all disruptions) di rect and indirect 
treatment effects on all channels and distributors and infer households’ substitution patterns from 
those estimates. 
In the last section of this paper I study how treatment effects vary across different  days 
of the week and programming types. In order to do so, I estimate treatment effects  for 
various time intervals within each day of the week and map them on the type of  
programming shown during that interval. 
While this paper presents an extensive study of effects of service disruptions in the  
multichannel television industry, all of the events included in the analyses happened during 
the year of 2016. A fruitful direction for further research would be to expand the set of events 
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Details on Nielsen Ad Intel Data 
Ad Intel covers 4 TV media types: Cable, Network, Syndicated, and Spot TV 
• For Cable TV, ads are purchased at a national level. Programming is broadcast 
nationally. 
• For Network and Syndicated TV, ads are purchased at a national level. The pro- grams 
are broadcast at local TV stations. 
• For Spot TV, ads are purchased at the DMA level. The programs are also broadcast at 
local TV stations. 
Impressions (Viewership) Data: 
• For the national media types (Cable, Network, and Syndicated), Ad Intel provides  the 
estimated number of impressions for each TV program on the national level 
• For the local media types (Network Clearance, Syndicated Clearance, and Spot),  Ad Intel 
provides the estimated impressions at Local Station-Month-Day of Week-5 Minute Time 
Interval level. 
Measuring Impressions: 
• For 25 markets (i.e., Local People Meter markets) impressions are measured using set top 
boxes. For these markets, local impressions are available in all months. The metered markets 
use Live+7 ratings 
• For other markets, local impressions data are only available in four sweeps months: February, 
May, July, and November and are measured by Nielsen households filling out diaries. For 
other months, impressions are calculated as an average between the two closest available 
months, weighted by the time difference. The diary markets use Live+24 ratings. 
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Universe Estimates: Ad Intel provides the estimated total number of TV audience at national 
and market level. These universe estimates are updated yearly. Advertising Spending Data 
Expenditure data reported for commercial activity is derived from household cost-per-point 
information supplied by SQAD LLC. The cost-per-point information is based upon actual 
spot television buys placed by advertising agencies and media buying services. The 
expenditures reported in Nielsen Ad Intel reflect a computation using a blended cost-per-point 
from SQAD data and Nielsen.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
